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NEGLIGENCE, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE 
CLUMSY SAMARITAN: IS THERE A FAIRNESS 




The Good Samaritan immunity has been roundly criticized for fail-
ing in its stated goal of encouraging physicians and laypersons to 
volunteer assistance in emergencies. Yet in the half century since its 
inception, all fifty states have adopted the immunity in one form or 
another, and it shows no sign of disappearing any time soon. This 
Article represents the first serious attempt in the literature to evaluate 
a rarely discussed rationale for the immunity which may explain its 
persistence: that it is unfair to impose negligence liability on the 
clumsy Samaritan, i.e., someone who, without obligation, altruistical-
ly comes to the aid of another in an emergency but does so ineptly. 
Based on a close examination of different types of voluntary res-
cue cases, I conclude that fairness does require an immunity but only 
in narrow circumstances: where a lay rescuer’s act of ordinary negli-
gence leaves the victim no worse off than she would have been ab-
sent the intervention (i.e., where the gravamen of the action is that a 
lay rescuer negligently failed to alleviate the pre-existing peril). Out-
side of these circumstances, principles of fairness support holding the 
clumsy Samaritan liable for negligence in performing the rescue. 
  
 *  Professor of Legal Analysis, Writing, and Skills, Southwestern Law School. A.B. Harvard Col-
lege. J.D. U.C.L.A. I am indebted to Alan Calnan, Michael B. Dorff, David Fagundes, Sam Feldman, 
Bryant Garth, Karin Graver, Warren Grimes, Hila Keren, Leib Lerner, Caleb Mason, Joseph MacKen-
zie, Art McEvoy, Austen Parrish, Gowri Ramachandran, Gary Rowe, Bob Schwartz, Shira Sergant, 
Seana Shiffrin, Brennan Spiegel, Byron Stier, Tracy Turner, Carol Waisman, James Waisman, and Eyal 
Zamir for their comments and support. I am grateful to Benjamin Tragish, Amy Huberman, Stephanie 
Ghanem Peatman, Hillary Higgins, and Stephanie Wissner for excellent research assistance. Thanks 
finally to Tanner’s Coffee in Culver City for providing a hospitable working environment. 
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This, I argue, has an important and unappreciated implication for 
negligence theory. My analysis presents a novel challenge to the 
view of corrective justice theorists like Ernest Weinrib, who contend 
that the duty to repair an injury caused by negligence rests on the 
culpable disrespect the injurer evinces in failing to act with due care. 
Because, in the paradigm case of voluntary rescue, the rescuer acts 
selflessly and out of a profound respect for the physical integrity of 
the imperiled person, the intuition that liability may nevertheless be 
appropriate if the rescuer fails to exercise reasonable care supports a 
competing view of the moral basis of negligence liability. The case of 
the clumsy Samaritan shows in a compelling way that the moral basis 
of negligence liability has to be the injurer’s moral responsibility for 
the consequences of her dangerous, even if non-culpable, conduct. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On a winter day in 1998, five friends rode their snowmobiles 
alongside a highway in rural Minnesota.1 Among them was thirteen-
year-old Kelly Swenson.2 When the snowmobile she was driving 
struck a drainage culvert in a ditch next to the highway, Swenson 
suffered a dislocated knee.3 Swenson’s companions flagged down a 
passing motorist, Lillian Tiegs, who offered to drive Swenson to a 
nearby hospital.4 After Swenson entered Tiegs’s van, Tiegs—
apparently without checking for oncoming traffic—attempted a U-
turn onto the opposite side of the highway.5 Before Tiegs could com-
plete the U-turn, a tractor-trailer traveling in the opposite direction 
struck the passenger side of her van, killing Swenson.6 
Under the common law, Swenson’s survivors would have been en-
titled to recover from Tiegs upon a showing that she acted negligent-
ly in making the U-turn.7 However, half a century ago, American 
state legislatures began abrogating the common law doctrine that al-
lows liability to be imposed on a volunteer rescuer for her negligence 
in performing the rescue.8 By 1980, all fifty states had enacted “Good 
Samaritan immunity” statutes shielding medical professionals (and, 
in most states, laypersons) from liability for ordinary negligence 
committed in the course of a voluntary,9 good-faith attempt to assist 
someone in an emergency.10 Thus, when Swenson’s survivors 
  
 1. Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794, 795 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 795–96. 
 5. Id. at 796. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 44 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1965); 57A AM. JUR. 2D 
Negligence § 106 (2004); 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 84 (2010). 
 8. Barry Sullivan, Some Thoughts on the Constitutionality of Good Samaritan Statutes, 8 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 27, 27 n.1 (1982) (listing state Good Samaritan laws). 
 9. Throughout this Article, I use the term “voluntary” in the following sense: “Without valuable 
consideration or legal obligation; gratuitous <voluntary gift>.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1710–11 
(9th ed. 2009). 
 10. See Sullivan, supra note 8; Henry R. Stiepel, Note, Good Samaritans and Hospital Emergencies, 
54 S. CAL. L. REV. 417, 421 (1981). 
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brought suit, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held Tiegs immune 
from liability under the state’s Good Samaritan immunity statute.11 
The policy justification courts and legislators have offered for the 
immunity has, without exception, been an instrumental one: to en-
courage people to offer help in emergency situations by allaying their 
fear of suit in the event the rescue goes badly.12 Over the past fifty 
years, the thrust of the scholarship on the immunity has been to ques-
tion its success in attaining this goal.13 One commentator after anoth-
er has voiced skepticism about whether, even at the margin, the im-
munity makes willing rescuers of people who otherwise would have 
looked the other way.14 
No commentator, however, appears to have addressed the equally 
fundamental question of whether the immunity can be justified on 
non-instrumental grounds; in particular, on the basis of fairness.15 On 
a gut level, penalizing a person for their clumsiness in performing an 
altruistic act of rescue seems unfair. But does this intuition withstand 
scrutiny, particularly when considered alongside the victim’s interest 
in being made whole? In this Article, I offer the first systematic at-
tempt to answer that question, which is important on two accounts. 
First, to the extent imposing negligence liability on clumsy Samar-
itans like Lillian Tiegs turns out to be unfair in some meaningful 
  
 11. Swenson, 653 N.W.2d at 800. This ruling came in an underinsured motorist action that Swen-
son’s survivors (her parents) filed against their own insurer. The Swensons had previously settled with 
both the tractor-trailer driver and Tiegs’s insurer. See infra note 171. 
 12. See generally Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Construction and Application of “Good Samari-
tan” Statutes, 68 A.L.R.4th 294, at § 2.5 (1989); see also sources cited infra note 89. 
 13. See sources cited infra note 129. 
 14. See sources cited infra note 129. 
 15. To be sure, some commentators have, without analysis, posited that it can. See, e.g., Christopher 
H. White, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: The Case for Reform of the Rescue Doctrine, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 507, 517 (2002) (“In all cases, however, the states passing such [Good Samaritan immunity] 
statutes appear to have recognized that a system that punishes people for performing altruistic acts is 
unfair to rescuers and discourages socially beneficial conduct.”). The notion of fairness I rely on 
throughout this Article is one articulated by Jules Coleman, among others. Fairness, as I understand it, 
refers to the general ideal of “reciprocity among free and equal individuals.” Jules Coleman, Tort Law 
and Tort Theory: Preliminary Reflections on Method, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 183, 206 
(Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001). As such, its fundamental requirement is that “no person be permitted to 
set the terms of cooperative interaction between individuals unilaterally.” Id. at 205. Following Cole-
man, I understand corrective justice theory as specifying the requirements of fairness in cases where one 
person has suffered a loss as the result of the agency of another person. See infra note 149. 
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sense, this blunts the force of much of the criticism the immunity has 
received. If the immunity is there as much to ensure volunteer rescu-
ers are treated fairly as for any other reason, it would seem to be a 
law worth having even if it has no appreciable effect on people’s be-
havior. 
Second, the question leads naturally to a consideration of the moral 
basis for negligence liability generally. Though scholars have widely 
discussed the corrective justice rationale for negligence liability,16 no 
commentator appears to have considered what light the case of sa-
marital negligence can shed on the debate. I do so here and argue that 
Swenson and similar cases involving clumsy Samaritans reveal some-
thing important about the moral underpinnings of negligence liabil-
ity. 
This Article has three parts. Parts One and Two are setup; Part 
Three lays out my argument. In Part One, I examine the common law 
volunteer rescuer doctrine, which the Good Samaritan immunity ab-
rogates.17 Here I point out an apparent conflict among the leading 
authorities. The conflict concerns whether liability is appropriate in a 
case where, without worsening the imperiled person’s plight, the vol-
unteer rescuer negligently fails to prevent the pre-existing peril from 
taking its harmful course. The Second and Third Restatements of 
Torts suggest liability may be appropriate in such circumstances;18 a 
number of leading cases and treatises suggest otherwise.19 I note the 
conflict here but do not attempt to resolve it until the final section of 
Part Three. 
In Part Two, I examine the origin and content of Good Samaritan 
immunity statutes in the United States and then discuss some broad 
trends in how courts have applied the statutes over the past fifty 
years.20 I also discuss the chief criticism that commentators have lev-
eled at the immunity: that it has failed, even at the margin, to make 
  
 16. See discussion infra note 149. 
 17. See infra Part I. 
 18. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 44 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1965). 
 19. See infra note 47. 
 20. See infra Part II. 
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willing rescuers of people who, absent the immunity, would have 
declined to intervene.21 
In Part Three, I turn to a critique of the rationale for the volunteer 
rescuer doctrine and, by implication, of the hypothesis that the Good 
Samaritan immunity can be justified as vindicating the rescuer’s fair-
ness interests.22 Based on a close examination of different types of 
voluntary rescue cases, I argue that the immunity can be justified on 
fairness grounds but only in narrow circumstances: where the grava-
men of the imperiled person’s action is that a lay rescuer, acting in 
good faith and without recklessness, negligently failed to alleviate the 
pre-existing peril but did not make the situation any worse. Other-
wise—i.e., where the rescuer is a physician or other medical profes-
sional, where the rescuer’s misconduct exceeds ordinary negligence, 
or where the rescuer’s intervention changes the imperiled person’s 
situation for the worse—fairness considerations support liability for 
injuries resulting from the rescuer’s negligent conduct. 
This finding has an important implication for the scholarly conver-
sation about the moral rationale for negligence liability. Broad con-
sensus exists that one of the primary justifications for negligence lia-
bility is corrective justice—the view that the central purpose of tort 
liability is to enforce agents’ duty to repair the wrongful losses they 
cause to other agents. Corrective justice theorists are divided, howev-
er, on the question of the precise moral basis of this duty in cases of 
negligence. 
On the one side are commentators like Ernest Weinrib, who main-
tain that negligent conduct intrinsically violates a deontological 
norm, such as acting with appropriate impartiality or showing ade-
quate respect for the physical security of others.23 Negligent conduct 
is, in this view, at least minimally morally culpable and this culpabil-
ity is the basis of imposing liability on the negligent actor.24 On the 
other side are commentators like Stephen Perry, who assert that neg-
  
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 152–53 (1995). 
 24. Id. 
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ligent conduct gives rise to responsibility for the harmful outcome 
regardless of whether such conduct is itself morally blameworthy.25 
On this view, negligent actors are morally responsible for injuries 
caused by their unreasonably dangerous conduct; the unreasonable 
conduct may itself be morally culpable, but it need not be for liability 
to properly attach.26 The responsibility-based view draws support 
from the inarguable fact that courts impose negligence liability on the 
basis of an objective standard—the care that a reasonably careful per-
son would exercise under the circumstances—without taking account 
of the sort of subjective facts thought to be relevant to culpability, 
e.g., facts relating to the negligent actor’s character, capacities, or 
accompanying mental state.27 
The common law’s imposition of negligence liability on the volun-
teer rescuer notwithstanding her having performed the rescue whole-
heartedly and in good faith—together with the sense that such liabil-
ity is, in many circumstances, justly imposed—represents a challenge 
to the culpability theory of negligence liability and provides support 
for the responsibility view. Because the entire voluntary rescue effort 
is, in the paradigm case anyway, founded on a profound and genuine 
concern for the physical well-being of the imperiled person, it seems 
implausible to attribute the negligent act to a failure of impartiality or 
a lack of adequate respect for the imperiled person’s physical securi-
ty. In many voluntary rescue cases, the rescuer’s negligent act, rather 
than evincing a failure to appropriately honor the imperiled person’s 
interest in physical integrity, is better characterized as a mistake or 
miscalculation made in the course of a sincere effort to promote that 
interest. The responsibility-based version of the corrective justice 
rationale for negligence liability can explain why such acts should 
  
 25. See Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY 
AND THE LAW OF TORTS 72, 73 (Gerald Postema ed., 2001) [hereinafter Perry, Responsibility]; Stephen 
R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 496–512 (1992) [hereinafter Perry, 
Moral Foundations]. 
 26. Perry, Moral Foundations, supra note 25, at 488–89. 
 27. This fact does not necessarily settle the debate, however. Adherents of the culpability view might 
contend that negligent conduct necessarily signifies a moral shortcoming in the act thus rendering super-
fluous any independent inquiry into the actor’s character, disposition, or state of mind. 
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give rise to liability despite their having been performed during a 
general course of conduct that shows genuine respect for the injured 
person’s agency. Because it premises a duty of repair directly on the 
injurer’s ownership of the risk materializing in harm rather than on 
the culpability of the risk-creating act, the responsibility-based view 
better accounts for the common law’s justifiable willingness to im-
pose liability on the clumsy Samaritan in appropriate circumstances. 
I. THE VOLUNTEER RESCUER AT COMMON LAW 
In this section, I examine the contours of the common law volun-
teer rescuer doctrine, which the Good Samaritan immunity abrogates. 
After outlining the basics of the doctrine, I illuminate a conflict be-
tween the Second and Third Restatements of Torts, on the one hand, 
and a number of other authorities (a line of cases and several tort 
treatises) on the other. The conflict concerns whether, at common 
law, a volunteer rescuer could be held liable merely for negligently 
failing to bring the imperiled person to safety, even where the rescu-
er’s action does not worsen the imperiled person’s position. The Re-
statements suggest such non-worsening negligence is actionable at 
common law while the other authorities suggest it is not.28 While I 
explain the conflict in this section, I do not attempt to resolve it until 
Part Three of this Article.29 There, I invoke Arthur Ripstein’s notion 
of risk ownership30 to argue for an intermediate position: from the 
standpoint of fairness, non-worsening samarital negligence should 
not be actionable unless: (1) the rescuer is a physician or other medi-
cal professional; or (2) the rescuer’s misconduct involves bad faith or 
exceeds ordinary negligence.31 
  
 28. For a discussion of the conflicting views and reasoning, see infra Part I.B. 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. Arthur Ripstein, Justice and Responsibility, 17 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 361, 386 (2004). 
 31. See infra Part III. 
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A. Doctrinal Basics 
As most first-year law students learn, the common law imposes no 
general duty to assist another in peril.32 In the words of an oft-cited 
decision, 
With the humane side of the question courts are not concerned. 
It is the omission or negligent discharge of legal duties only 
which come within the sphere of judicial cognizance. For with-
holding relief from the suffering, for failure to respond to the 
calls of worthy charity, or for faltering in the bestowment of 
brotherly love on the unfortunate, penalties are found not in the 
laws of men, but in that higher law, the violation of which is 
condemned by the voice of conscience, whose sentence of pun-
ishment for the recreant act is swift and sure.33 
At common law, a duty to assist an imperiled person arises only in 
specific circumstances: where one has a special relationship with that 
person (e.g., employer–employee, common carrier–passenger, inn-
keeper–guest)34 or where one is responsible, innocently or tortiously, 
  
 32. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 37 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“An actor whose conduct has not created a risk of physical harm to 
another has no duty of care to the other unless a court determines that one of the affirmative duties 
provided in §§ 38–44 is applicable.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965); see also 57A 
AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 7, § 106 (“Generally, there is no duty to aid a person who is in distress or 
danger, even if the rescue can be accomplished at no cost to the rescuer. In other words, the law imposes 
no liability upon those who stand idly by and fail to rescue a stranger who is in danger.”); 65 C.J.S., 
supra note 7, §§ 79, 80, 82. Three states—Minnesota, Vermont, and Rhode Island—have enacted stat-
utes that, to some extent, abrogate this rule by imposing affirmative duties to perform easy rescues, and 
at least one state—Wisconsin—requires a bystander at the scene of a crime to assist the victim or report 
the incident to the police. See MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (2011); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 2011). New Hampshire impos-
es a more narrow affirmative duty to assist, which requires a rescuer to place an imperiled person under 
the care of a qualified medical professional after she has voluntarily provided emergency assistance as 
soon as it is feasible. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:12 (West 2011). 
 33. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281, 282 (Kan. 1903). 
 34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 40 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); 57A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 7, § 90 (“Generally, in the absence of 
some special relation between the parties, the law imposes no duty on one person to come to the aid of 
another, even though the means by which harm can be averted are in his or her possession, unless the 
dangerous situation was created by such person. Thus, in the absence of a special relationship, no one is 
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for creating the peril.35 Absent these circumstances, one violates no 
legal duty if one stands idly by and watches another person succumb 
to the danger they are facing.36 
Once one undertakes to assist and takes charge of a helpless and 
imperiled person, however, the common law imposes a duty to use 
reasonable care in the undertaking, even if one had no duty to assist 
as an initial matter.37 This requirement, which I refer to as the “vol-
unteer rescuer doctrine,”38 is a species of the general common law 
rule that one who undertakes to perform any act, whether gratuitously 
or for consideration, is bound to exercise reasonable care in doing 
so.39 According to the general rule, a person’s failure to use reasona-
  
required to save another from a danger which is not of his or her making.”); 65 C.J.S., supra note 7, 
§§ 79, 82. 
 35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 39 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 321, 322 (1965); 57A AM. 
JUR. 2D, supra note 7, § 90; 65 C.J.S., supra note 7, §§ 80, 82. 
 36. This principle has been the subject of extensive criticism by scholars. See, e.g., Ernest J. Wein-
rib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 293 (1980). 
 37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 44 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“(a) An actor who, despite no duty to do so, takes charge of another 
who reasonably appears to be: (1) imperiled and (2) helpless or unable to protect himself or herself has a 
duty to exercise reasonable care while the other is within the actor’s charge. (b) An actor who discontin-
ues aid or protection is subject to a duty of reasonable care to refrain from putting the other in a worse 
position than existed before the actor took charge of the other and, if the other reasonably appears to be 
in imminent peril of serious bodily harm at the time of termination, to exercise reasonable care with 
regard to the peril before terminating the rescue.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1965) 
(“One who, being under no duty to do so, takes charge of another who is helpless adequately to aid or 
protect himself is subject to liability to the other for any bodily harm caused to him by (a) the failure of 
the actor to exercise reasonable care to secure the safety of the other while within the actor’s charge, or 
(b) the actor’s discontinuing his aid or protection, if by so doing he leaves the other in a worse position 
than when the actor took charge of him.”); 57A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 7, § 106 (“[O]ne who voluntari-
ly assumes to assist a sick, injured, or imperiled person, while not an insurer, is charged with the duty of 
common or ordinary humanity to provide proper care and attention.”); 65 C.J.S., supra note 7, §§ 83, 
84. Although the Second and Third Restatements include a “taking charge” requirement as part of the 
volunteer rescuer doctrine, many cases and treatises omit such a requirement. 
 38. I use this term rather than “Good Samaritan doctrine” to distinguish the rescue-related rule from 
the rule applying to voluntary undertakings of other kinds. Many cases and commentators, however, use 
the latter term to refer specifically to the common law doctrine relating to liability of a volunteer rescu-
er. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 47. 
 39. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 42 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965); 57A AM. JUR. 
2D, supra note 7, § 193 (“The law imposes a duty upon everyone who attempts to do anything, even 
gratuitously, for another, to exercise some degree of care and skill in the performance of what he or she 
has undertaken.”); see also Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64–65 (1955) (“[I]t is 
hornbook tort law that one who undertakes to warn the public of danger and thereby induces reliance 
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ble care in performing a voluntary undertaking is actionable only if it 
leaves the victim in a worse position than she would have been in 
absent the undertaking.40 As we will see shortly, the leading authori-
ties appear to disagree about whether and to what extent such a posi-
tion-worsening requirement applies in the case of the volunteer res-
cuer doctrine.41 
In determining negligence liability, the common law holds persons 
acting in emergency situations to a lower standard of care than would 
otherwise apply.42 This lowering of the standard of care—commonly 
known as the “emergency doctrine”—applies not only in instances 
where the emergency assistance is gratuitously offered, but also to 
situations where it is offered for compensation by a doctor or other 
professional.43 
Further, according to the Second and Third Restatements of Torts, 
the gratuitous nature of the actor’s conduct should be taken into ac-
count in determining whether the actor used reasonable care.44 Thus, 
by implication, gratuitous emergency assistance would presumably 
be subject to a more lenient standard of care than emergency aid pro-
vided pursuant to a pre-existing professional or legal duty. Although 
Restatement (Second) takes the position that the gratuitous nature of 
the assistance should affect the applicable standard of care only 
  
must perform his ‘good Samaritan’ task in a careful manner.”). 
 40. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 42 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (requiring increased risk or reliance for liability based on negli-
gence in voluntary undertaking); see also id. at § 43; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 381 (5th ed. 1984) (“Many of the decisions state that some such [situa-
tion-worsening] element is necessary, and that there can be no liability where the conduct in no way 
aggravates the situation or misleads the plaintiff, and he is left no worse off than he was before.”). 
 41. See infra Part I.B. 
 42. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 9 (2010) (“If an actor is confronted with an unexpected emergency requiring rapid response, this is a 
circumstance to be taken into account in determining whether the actor’s resulting conduct is that of the 
reasonably careful person.”). 
 43. See 1 Med. Malpractice (MB) § 9.06 (Oct. 2008) (“Recognizing that the practice of medicine 
often requires that decisions be made and actions taken under stressful circumstances, the courts tend to 
appraise the professional acts performed under such circumstances less severely than those done under 
more normal circumstances.”). 
 44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 44 
cmt. f (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 cmt. d (1965). 
Neither comment cites authority for this proposition, however. 
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where the defendant’s negligence did not worsen the imperiled per-
son’s position, Restatement (Third) appears to have dispensed with 
that restriction.45 
B. Conflicting Views On Non-Worsening Negligence  
These aspects of the common law rules pertinent to voluntary res-
cues are relatively clear and uncontroversial. However, this is not 
quite the end of the doctrinal story. Courts have traditionally declared 
themselves unwilling to impose liability on a mere showing that, 
through a failure to use reasonable care, a volunteer rescuer injured 
the person she was attempting to assist.46 The injured party has tradi-
tionally been required to show that the ultimate result of the rescuer’s 
conduct was to place the injured party in a worse position than she 
would have been in had that particular rescuer never intervened.47 I 
will refer to this as the “general position-worsening requirement.” As 
one court has put it, “The liability in most cases has arisen because 
  
 45. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 cmt. d (1965), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 44 cmt. f (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 
2005). 
 46. Rodrigue v. United States, 968 F.2d 1430, 1434 (1st Cir. 1992) (“[T]he Good Samaritan rule 
does not impose liability for mere negligent failure to confer a benefit, but only for negligently making 
matters worse.” (citing United States v. DeVane, 306 F.2d 182, 186 (3d Cir. 1962))). 
 47. See, e.g., id. at 1434; DeVane, 306 F.2d at 186 (“The worsening question arises under the Good 
Samaritan doctrine which provides that the negligence of the volunteer rescuer must worsen the position 
of the person in distress before liability will be imposed.” (citing United States v. Gavagan, 280 F.2d 
319 (5th Cir. 1960))); Ocotillo W. Joint Venture v. Superior Court, 844 P.2d 653, 656 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1992) (“[T]he good samaritan doctrine applies when an actor, otherwise without any duty to do so, 
voluntarily takes charge of an intoxicated person who is attempting to drive a vehicle and, because of 
the actor’s failure to exercise reasonable care, has changed the other’s position for the worse.” (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 323, 324 cmts. b, c (1965))); Gates v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. 
Co., 213 S.W. 564, 568 (Ky. Ct. App. 1919) (“Unless the acts complained of aggravated the injury, or 
made his condition worse, clearly the company would not be liable.”); Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 
217, 220 (Mich. 1976) (“Without regard to whether there is a general duty to aid a person in distress, 
there is a clearly recognized legal duty of every person to avoid any affirmative acts which may make a 
situation worse.”); see also 57A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 7, § 107 (citing DeVane, 306 F.2d 182); 65 
C.J.S., supra note 7, § 84 (citing Rodrigue, 968 F.2d 1430); 3 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. 
& OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS 879 (3d ed. 2007) (“Again, the undertaking to 
rescue, although not required, gives rise to the duty to exercise care not to leave the object of the rescue 
in worse condition than if the rescue had not been attempted.”); KEETON ET AL., supra note 40, § 56, at 
378 (“If there is no duty to go to the assistance of a person in difficulty or peril, there is at least a duty to 
avoid any affirmative acts which make his situation worse.”). 
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defendant made the situation worse, either by increasing the danger, 
or by misleading plaintiff into the belief it had been removed, or by 
inducing him to forego the possibility of help from other sources.”48 
With such a requirement in place, the volunteer rescuer doctrine 
would deny recovery where the plaintiff’s grievance is merely that, 
as a result of the rescuer’s negligence, she failed to realize any bene-
fit from the rescuer’s efforts or did not benefit to the extent she 
would have had the rescuer used reasonable care.49 This means that 
the plaintiff must generally do more than show that the rescuer negli-
gently failed to prevent the pre-existing peril from taking its course.50 
She must show that, by creating a new risk of harm, increasing the 
already-existing risk, or inducing reliance by the plaintiff or by others 
in a position to offer assistance, the rescuer left the imperiled person 
worse off than she would have been had the rescuer chosen not to 
intervene.51 The chief practical effect of this requirement has been to 
bar recovery in sea rescue cases where the gravamen of the plaintiff’s 
claim was that the volunteer rescuer negligently failed to locate the 
imperiled person or negligently failed to reach the imperiled person 
in time to save him.52 
Interestingly, though, the Restatement (Third) and Restatement 
(Second) of Torts both reject the notion that the volunteer rescuer 
doctrine imposes a general position-worsening requirement.53 Re-
  
 48. Steckman v. Silver Moon, Inc., 90 N.W.2d 170, 173 (S.D. 1958) (collecting cases); see also 
Hurd v. United States, 34 F. App’x 77, 84 (4th Cir. 2002) (“There are two ways in which a rescuer can 
worsen the position of the subject of the rescue. The first is by increasing the risk of harm to the person 
in distress. The second is to induce reliance, either by the subject or other potential rescuers, on the 
rescuer’s efforts.” (citations omitted)); Fondow v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 2d 119, 130 (D. Mass. 
2000). 
 49. Rodrigue, 968 F.2d at 1434. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Frank v. United States, 250 F.2d 178, 180 (3d Cir. 1957). 
 52. See, e.g., id. at 179–80; Daley v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 1005, 1010 (D. Mass. 1980); Lacey 
v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 219, 220 (D. Mass. 1951). Many of the cases applying the volunteer rescu-
er doctrine involve rescues undertaken by the Coast Guard, which has no legal duty to aid persons in 
distress. See, e.g., Bunting v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 971, 973 (D. Alaska 1987). Moreover, under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Coast Guard is liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as a 
private individual under like circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006). 
 53. Restatement (Third)’s rejection of a general position-worsening requirement is evident in its 
observation that the volunteer rescuer doctrine does not require reliance or increased risk of harm, as 
well as in the stop-at-the-tavern illustration discussed. See infra note 57. A comment to Section 324 of 
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statement (Third) specifically notes that the volunteer rescuer doc-
trine “d[oes] not require reliance or increased risk”54 and that the ab-
sence of such a requirement represents a “special and more stringent 
invocation of an affirmative duty than the other undertaking duties 
because of the helpless condition of the plaintiff.”55 By the lights of 
the Restatement, the volunteer rescuer doctrine would allow a plain-
tiff to recover where the volunteer rescuer—without increasing the 
risk to the plaintiff, inducing reliance of any kind, or otherwise wors-
ening the plaintiff’s position—negligently failed to provide a benefit 
to the imperiled person, or did not provide the same benefit she 
would have had she exercised reasonable care.56 An illustration in 
  
Restatement (Second) implicitly rejects a general position-worsening requirement. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 cmt. d (1965) (“Where the actor’s conduct has changed the other’s position 
for the worse, the fact that the actor was under no duty in the first instance to render the services is 
immaterial in determining whether or not he has exercised reasonable care. On the other hand, where the 
other’s only ground of complaint is that he has failed to receive benefit from the actor’s assistance, the 
gratuitous nature of the services is an important factor in determining whether the actor has exercised 
reasonable care.”) (emphasis added). 
 54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 44 cmt. a 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1965)). 
 55. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 cmt. a (1965)). 
 56. It is important to note, however, that the Restatements do not reject a position-worsening re-
quirement tout court. Both Restatement (Third) and Restatement (Second) embrace such a requirement 
in (at least some) cases where the injury-causing act is alleged to be the negligent manner in which the 
rescuer discontinues assistance rather than his negligence in actually conducting the rescue. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 44(b) (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324(b) (1965). In this regard, Restate-
ment (Third) appears to differ from Restatement (Second) in two respects. First, while Restatement 
(Second) imposes strict liability on a rescuer who, in discontinuing his efforts, leaves the victim in a 
worse position, Restatement (Third) imposes liability only where the rescuer’s discontinuation is negli-
gent. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 44 report-
ers’ note, cmt. h (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“This Section eschews strict liability when a rescu-
er leaves another worse off, instead requiring that the actor exercise reasonable care not to leave the 
other in a worse position upon termination.”). Second, under Restatement (Third), the scope of the 
position-worsening requirement appears to be narrower than under Restatement (Second). While Re-
statement (Second) imposes liability for a discontinuation of assistance if (and only if) the discontinua-
tion leaves the imperiled person in a worse position, Restatement (Third) imposes liability for any 
negligent discontinuation that occurs at a time when the person being assisted faces an imminent risk of 
serious bodily injury. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 44(b) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 324(b) (1965). Thus, under Restatement (Third), the rescuer who negligently discontinues assistance 
while the victim is still in imminent peril of serious bodily injury will be held liable under the volunteer 
rescuer doctrine even if he leaves the victim no worse off than before the rescue began. Under Restate-
ment (Third), then, negligently discontinuing assistance at a time when the victim is not in imminent 
peril of serious bodily injury would be actionable only if the victim was left worse off as a result. 
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Restatement (Third) makes clear beyond question that this is the 
drafters’ view: 
[I]f an observer, seeing a pedestrian who was run down by a hit-
and-run driver and who is bleeding badly, takes the pedestrian in 
an automobile and runs into a tree, breaking the pedestrian’s 
nose, the rescuer is subject to the ordinary duty of reasonable 
care. Reference to [the volunteer rescuer doctrine] is unnecessary 
because the rescuer’s conduct in driving the pedestrian created a 
risk of harm, requiring the exercise of reasonable care. That the 
harm occurred in the course of a rescue rather than some other 
occasion does not affect the ordinary duty of care. On the other 
hand, if the rescuer, while driving the pedestrian to the hospital, 
decides to make a stop at a local tavern, the rescuer is subject to 
liability for any enhanced harm caused by the delay pursuant to 
this Section, even if the pedestrian would not have arrived at the 
hospital any earlier if the actor had declined to rescue.57 
In the example described in the final sentence, the point of specifying 
that liability should attach “even if the pedestrian would not have 
arrived at the hospital any earlier if the actor had declined to res-
cue”58 is to establish that the pedestrian need not have been placed in 
a worse position as a result of the rescuer’s negligence. Thus, the 
gravamen of the pedestrian’s negligence action in this case would 
have to be merely that she failed to benefit from the rescuer’s inter-
vention to the extent she would have had the rescuer exercised rea-
sonable care (i.e., had the rescuer driven straight to the hospital with-
out stopping). In other words, the plaintiff is seeking to recover for 
harm that could have been avoided had the rescuer exercised reason-
able care, even though the harm suffered is exactly the same as that 
  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 44(b) (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 44 cmt. e 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (emphasis added). 
 58. Id. 
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which would have been suffered had the rescuer never intervened. 
The Restatement’s position that liability is appropriate under such 
circumstances therefore conflicts with the general position-worsening 
requirement articulated in a number of the leading cases,59 as well as 
in several tort treatises.60 
What to make of this conflict? On the one hand, the published cas-
es do not seem to offer any direct support for the Restatement’s posi-
tion.61 There does not appear to be a case decided under the volunteer 
rescuer doctrine in which a rescuer was held liable for an act, com-
mitted in the course of performing the rescue, that did not in any 
way—by increasing the risk of harm, inducing reliance, or other-
wise—place the victim in a worse position than she would have been 
had the rescuer chosen not to intervene.62 Moreover, in a handful of 
cases involving Coast Guard rescues, courts declined to impose lia-
bility because the rescuer’s negligence did not worsen the plight of 
the imperiled person.63 These cases do not actually contradict the 
Restatement’s position, however. With the possible exception of 
Frank64—which is highly unusual in featuring a peril that arises after 
  
 59. A comment in Restatement (Third) concedes that a “long line of admiralty cases” has posited the 
existence of a general position-worsening requirement as part of the volunteer rescuer doctrine when 
applied to “coast-guard rescue[s].” Id. § 44 reporters’ note, cmt. b. However, as the cases cited supra 
note 47 make clear, such a requirement has been articulated in a number of cases not involving a Coast 
Guard rescue. 
 60. See, e.g., HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 47, at 879; KEETON ET AL., supra note 40, § 56, at 
378. 
 61. See cases cited supra notes 46–47. 
 62. There is, however, some support for Restatement (Third)’s position that, when a rescuer is al-
leged to have been negligent in discontinuing, as opposed to performing, the rescue, the imperiled 
person need not show that she was left in a worse position than she would have been in had the rescuer 
never intervened, provided a risk of serious physical harm is present at the time of discontinuation. See, 
e.g., Parvi v. City of Kingston, 362 N.E.2d 960, 965 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that because the duty imposed 
by the volunteer rescuer doctrine “cannot be fulfilled by placing the helpless person in a position of peril 
equal to that from which he was rescued,” the city was liable for negligence where, after ordering two 
intoxicated individuals off the street and into their patrol car late at night, city police officers drove them 
to an unlit, isolated, and abandoned golf course located 350 feet from a highway from which they sub-
sequently wandered onto the highway and were struck by a car). 
 63. See cases cited supra note 52. 
 64. Frank v. United States, 250 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1957). In Frank, the victim fell into the water after 
the Coast Guard had begun to tow his disabled boat. Id. at 179. The case is unusual from the standpoint 
of the volunteer rescuer doctrine because the victim became imperiled while already in the charge of his 
would-be rescuers. 
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the rescuers have, for another purpose, taken charge of the victim—
all of those cases involved negligence that occurred after the rescue 
had been undertaken but before the rescuers had taken charge of the 
persons in peril.65 Thus, the Restatement’s “taking charge” require-
ment would presumably bar liability.66 In Lacey, for example, the 
Coast Guard rescuers, despite undertaking the rescue, never actually 
took charge of the imperiled persons, either by establishing physical 
contact with them or discouraging other rescuers from intervening.67 
The gravamen of the complaint was that Coast Guard personnel had 
negligently failed to reach the passengers and crewmembers while 
they were still alive.68 There does not, then, appear to be a single case 
decided under the volunteer rescuer doctrine that involves a negligent 
act that occurred after the rescuer had taken charge of the imperiled 
person but that did not increase the risk of harm or otherwise worsen 
the imperiled person’s position. 
Thus, in their actual holdings regarding liability, the cases apply-
ing the volunteer rescuer doctrine seem to be silent as to whether, 
when a rescuer’s negligent act occurs after he takes charge of the im-
periled person, liability can be imposed absent a worsening of the 
imperiled person’s position.69 In light of this silence, the question 
arises whether, as a normative matter, it makes sense to construe the 
common law as imposing liability for an act of samarital negligence 
in such circumstances. I am going to put this question aside for the 
moment, but will return to it in section III.D.70 
  
 65. See cases cited supra note 52. 
 66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 44(a) (Proposed Final 
Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 67. Lacey v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 219, 220 (D. Mass. 1951). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See cases cited supra notes 46–47. 
 70. See infra Part III.D. 
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II. THE GOOD SAMARITAN IMMUNITY 
The King James Bible recounts two exchanges between Jesus and 
a lawyer.71 In the Book of Matthew, a lawyer asks Jesus, “Master, 
which is the great commandment in the law?”72 Jesus replies, “Thou 
shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, 
and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And 
the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.”73 
The second exchange, in the Book of Luke, picks up where the 
first leaves off. A lawyer presses Jesus, “And who is my neigh-
bour?”74 Jesus’s response represents one of the most well-known 
passages in the New Testament, the so-called “Parable of the Good 
Samaritan”: 
A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell 
among thieves, which stripped him of his raiment, and wounded 
him, and departed, leaving him half dead. And by chance there 
came down a certain priest that way: and when he saw him, he 
passed by on the other side. And likewise a Levite, when he was 
at the place, came and looked on him, and passed by on the other 
side. But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he 
was: and when he saw him, he had compassion on him, And 
went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, 
and set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn, and 
took care of him. And on the morrow when he departed, he took 
out two pence, and gave them to the host, and said unto him, 
Take care of him; and whatsoever thou spendest more, when I 
come again, I will repay thee.75 
  
 71. Some versions of the Bible refer to Jesus’s interlocutor differently. Compare Matthew 22:35 
(New International Version) (“an expert in the law”), with Matthew 22:35 (New Living Translation) 
(“an expert in religious law”). 
 72. Matthew 22:36 (King James). 
 73. Id. at 22:37–39. 
 74. Luke 10:29 (King James). 
 75. Id. at 10:30–35. 
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Jesus then asks the lawyer, “Which now of these three, thinkest thou, 
was neighbour unto him that fell among the thieves? And he [the 
lawyer] said, He that shewed mercy on him. Then said Jesus unto 
him, Go, and do thou likewise.”76 
It is a well-known (and often lamented) feature of the common law 
that it imposes no duty to act as the biblical Samaritan did. As dis-
cussed in the previous section, the common law imposes no general 
duty to assist a stranger in peril.77 However, as Justice Cardozo not-
ed, “It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though 
gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting care-
fully, if he acts at all.”78 Thus, though the common law imposes no 
general duty to assist an imperiled and helpless stranger, it does im-
pose a duty of reasonable care once one voluntarily undertakes a res-
cue.79 “The result of all this,” observed Dean Prosser, “is that the 
Good Samaritan who tries to help may find himself mulcted in dam-
ages, while the priest and the Levite who pass by on the other side go 
on their cheerful way rejoicing.”80 
In 1959, California abrogated the common law doctrine in this area 
by enacting the nation’s first Good Samaritan immunity statute.81 The 
rest of the states soon followed suit, passing some version of a law 
shielding medical professionals (and, in most states, laypersons) from 
liability for ordinary negligence committed in the course of a volun-
tary, gratuitous, and good-faith attempt to assist someone in an emer-
gency.82 The rationale courts have since offered for the immunity 
has, without exception, been instrumental. The immunity’s purpose is 
  
 76. Id. at 10:36–37. 
 77. See sources cited supra note 32. 
 78. Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 1922). 
 79. See sources cited supra note 37. 
 80. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 344 (4th ed. 1971); see also Frank J. 
Helminski, Note, Good Samaritan Statutes: Time for Uniformity, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 217, 220 (1981) 
(“Many courts were disturbed by a rule which made a well-intentioned though incompetent humanitari-
an liable, but excused persons who showed indifference to the sufferings of others.”). 
 81. Helminski, supra note 80, at 218 n.4. 
 82. Sullivan, supra note 8. 
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said to be to encourage people to provide emergency assistance by 
allaying the fear of suit in the event the rescue goes badly.83 
In this section, I provide some general background on Good Sa-
maritan immunity statutes in the United States. I show that the im-
munity was conceived as a means of encouraging physicians to pro-
vide voluntary assistance in emergency situations by assuaging their 
fear of being sued for malpractice by the person in peril.84 I also 
show that the little empirical evidence available tends to support 
commentators’ broad skepticism that the immunity has succeeded in 
this ambition.85 This makes the question posed by this Article a 
pressing one. Good Samaritan immunity statutes have persisted—
indeed, proliferated—in the half century since their inception, not-
withstanding the pervasive skepticism among commentators that they 
actually incent voluntary rescues and the absence of any empirical 
data suggesting they do.86 Might their true purpose be to protect the 
rescuer’s fairness interests? 
A. Origin 
Although in most states Good Samaritan immunity statutes cur-
rently shield both laypersons and a range of professionals,87 the stat-
utes originated with concerns about and among physicians.88 Com-
  
 83. See, e.g., Deal v. Kearney, 851 P.2d 1353, 1356–57 (Alaska 1993); Lee v. State, 490 P.2d 1206, 
1209 (Alaska 1971); Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hosp., 537 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Ariz. 1975) (en banc); 
Reynoso v. Newman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 5, 8 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Colby v. Schwartz, 144 Cal. Rptr. 624, 
627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); Neal v. Yang, 816 N.E.2d 853, 858 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); Pemberton v. Dhar-
mani, 525 N.W.2d 497, 500 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794, 
797 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); Velazquez ex rel. Velazquez v. Jiminez, 763 A.2d 753, 774 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2000); McDaniel v. Keck, 861 N.Y.S.2d 516, 518 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008); McDowell v. 
Gillie, 626 N.W.2d 666, 671 (N.D. 2001); Jackson v. Mercy Health Ctr., Inc., 864 P.2d 839, 843 (Okla. 
1993); In re Certification of a Question of Law, 779 N.W.2d 158, 163 (S.D. 2010); Chau v. Riddle, 254 
S.W.3d 453, 456 (Tex. 2008); Hirpa v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 948 P.2d 785, 789 (Utah 1997); Hardingham 
v. United Counseling Serv. of Bennington, 667 A.2d 289, 292 (Vt. 1995); Mueller v. McMillian Warner 
Ins. Co., 714 N.W.2d 183, 189 (Wis. 2006). 
 84. See infra Part II.A. 
 85. See infra Part II.D. 
 86. See infra Part II.A–D. 
 87. See 4 Med. Malpractice Online, supra note 43, § 21.05 (Oct. 2012) (listing state-by-state Good 
Samaritan statutes and describing persons covered, circumstances, and required conduct). 
 88. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 40, § 56, at 378. 
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mentators writing in the immediate aftermath of California’s enact-
ment of the nation’s first immunity statute identified two distinct, but 
related, impetuses for the legislation.89 The first, intriguingly, seems 
to have been a single, widely disseminated anecdote involving the 
failure of several physicians to assist a stranger in an emergency.90 A 
woman skiing in the Squaw Valley-Lake Tahoe area of Northern Cal-
ifornia had fallen on the slopes and injured herself.91 Although there 
were several doctors in the vicinity available to assist, they all failed 
to volunteer.92 Or so the story goes. Two student commentators writ-
ing in the early 1960s reported direct correspondence with William 
Byron Rumford, then-Chairman of the California Assembly’s Com-
mittee on Public Health, in which Assemblyman Rumford specifical-
ly cited this incident in connection with the immunity legislation.93 
The other, and probably more significant impetus was the wide-
spread perception that doctors had become reluctant to volunteer in 
emergencies because of a pervasive fear of being sued for malprac-
tice.94 Some commentators have attributed this fear to the general 
increase in malpractice litigation that occurred in the decades follow-
ing World War II.95 As many commentators have noted, the fear 
could not have been based on actual liability determinations in re-
  
 89. See Eric A. Brandt, Comment, Good Samaritan Laws—The Legal Placebo: A Current Analysis, 
17 AKRON L. REV. 303, 306, 332 (1983); Norman S. Oberstein, Note, Torts: California Good Samaritan 
Legislation: Exemption from Civil Liability While Rendering Emergency Medical Aid, 51 CALIF. L. 
REV. 816, 817–18 (1963). 
 90. See Oberstein, supra note 89, at 818. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.; see also Note, Good Samaritans and Liability for Medical Malpractice, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 
1301, 1301 (1964). 
 93. See Note, supra note 92, at 1301 n.2; Oberstein, supra note 89, at 818 n.13. The early commen-
tators mention other similar anecdotes. See, e.g., Note, supra note 92, at 1301 (“On the Bronx 
Whitestone Bridge, a motorist lay in need of urgent medical attention as a physician drove past and 
deliberately declined to stop.”); Oberstein, supra note 90, at 818 n.12 (“Assemblyman Rumford stated 
that the oral hearings disclosed numerous incidents where accident victims remained unattended due to 
the physician’s fear of a malpractice suit.”); see also Lynwood M. Holland, The Good Samaritan Laws: 
A Reappraisal, 16 J. PUB. L. 128, 130 n.17 (1967) (discussing an incident in which a resident surgeon 
was held liable for $10,000 in damages after providing gratuitous medical care to girl with fractured 
arm, which healed improperly). 
 94. See Brandt, supra note 89, at 332. 
 95. See, e.g., Holland, supra note 93, at 132; Oberstein, supra note 89, at 817; Stiepel, supra note 10, 
at 419–20 & nn.15 & 16. 
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ported cases since, prior to 1959, not a single reported decision exist-
ed in which a physician was held liable for negligence in providing 
gratuitous medical care in an emergency.96 Of course, if the relevant 
fear is of being sued, and not merely of being held liable, the absence 
of such reported decisions is largely beside the point.97 Moreover, 
even if the fear of being named in a malpractice suit proved unfound-
ed, it could still have an inhibitory effect on doctors’ willingness to 
offer assistance in an emergency. But however baseless this fear may 
have proven to be, the Good Samaritan immunity was conceived as a 
means of allaying it and thereby encouraging doctors to volunteer 
their services in an emergency.98 
In a 1978 article, Richard Posner and William Landes hypothe-
sized that Good Samaritan immunity statutes—which they deemed 
“puzzling from an economic standpoint”—”are to be explained—as 
so much legislation is to be explained, including other legislation 
affecting physicians—by the political power of the beneficiaries ra-
ther than by the community’s interest in promoting efficiency.”99 
Consistent with this hypothesis, the effort to pass Good Samaritan 
immunity legislation in the United States was spearheaded by profes-
sional associations of doctors and nurses.100 Both the California 
Nurses Association and the California Medical Association spon-
sored the initial California bill.101 Outside California, the American 
  
 96. A number of commentators have reached this conclusion. See, e.g., Holland, supra note 94, at 
133 (quoting Law Medicine Notes, 260 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1003 (1964)); Frank B. Mapel, III & Charles 
J. Weigel, II, Good Samaritan Laws—Who Needs Them?: The Current State of Good Samaritan Protec-
tion in the United States, 21 S. TEX. L. J. 327, 330 (1980–1981); Theodore Flowers & William J. Ken-
nedy, Note, Good Samaritan Legislation: An Analysis and a Proposal, 38 TEMP. L. Q. 409, 419 n.9 
(1965); Robert A. Mason, Comment, Good Samaritan Laws—Legal Disarray: An Update, 38 MERCER 
L. REV. 1439, 1441 n.16 (1987). 
 97. See, e.g., Stewart R. Reuter, Physicians as Good Samaritans: Should They Receive Immunity for 
Their Negligence When Responding to Hospital Emergencies?, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 157, 158 (1999) (“[I]t 
was not so much the physician’s fear of losing suits that helped shape this type of legislation but, rather, 
the fear of being sued at all.”); Note, supra note 92, at 1312; Stiepel, supra note 10, at 421 n.22. 
 98. See generally Veilleux, supra note 12, § 2.5; see also cases cited supra note 83. 
 99. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescu-
ers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 127 (1978). 
 100. See Flowers & Kennedy, supra note 96, at 418 n.5; Oberstein, supra note 89, at 816–18. 
 101. See Flowers & Kennedy, supra note 96, at 418 n.5; Oberstein, supra note 89, at 817 n.8. Interest-
ingly, none of the legislative hearings held in connection with the initial California bill were recorded 
nor were briefs filed by the sponsors. Oberstein, supra note 89, at 817 n.6. 
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College of Surgeons, the American Association for the Surgery of 
Trauma, and the National Safety Council “worked together in a joint 
action program to foster such legislation,” according to one commen-
tator.102 
Once California enacted the first immunity statute in 1959, other 
states quickly began following suit. By 1966, thirty-three states had 
enacted Good Samaritan immunity legislation.103 By 1980, every 
state in the nation, along with the Virgin Islands and the District of 
Columbia, had done so.104 
B. Content 
The scope of the Good Samaritan immunity’s protection varies 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. A substantial majority of jurisdic-
tions have an immunity statute protecting any person who can meet 
the statutory requirements, including laypersons.105 However, a size-
able minority of jurisdictions exclude laypersons from the immuni-
ty’s protection, extending it only to certain classes of professionals 
(e.g., physicians, nurses, osteopaths, emergency medical profession-
als, etc.).106 
Here are two Good Samaritan immunity statutes, the first typical 
of those written to protect all persons, the second typical of those 
protecting physicians or other professionals: 
Any person who in good faith renders emergency care, without 
remuneration or expectation of remuneration, at the scene of an 
accident or emergency to a victim of the accident or emergency 
shall not be liable for any civil damages resulting from the per-
son’s acts or omissions, except for such damages as may result 
  
 102. Flowers & Kennedy, supra note 96, at 418 n.5. 
 103. See Holland, supra note 93, at 130–31; Flowers & Kennedy, supra note 96, at 419, 431. 
 104. See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 27; Stiepel, supra note 10, at 421. 
 105. Thirty-eight jurisdictions have statutes protecting all persons. See 4 Med. Malpractice, supra 
note 43, at § 21.05 (2012). 
 106. The fourteen jurisdictions whose statutes protect only specified professionals are: Alabama, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, the Virgin Islands, and Utah. Id. 
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from the person’s gross negligence or wanton acts or omis-
sions.107 
 
A person licensed to practice medicine and surgery [in Connecti-
cut] or dentistry [in Connecticut] or members of the same profes-
sions licensed to practice in any other state of the United States, 
a person licensed as a registered nurse . . . or certified as a li-
censed practical nurse [in Connecticut], a medical technician or 
any person operating a cardiopulmonary resuscitator or a person 
trained in cardiopulmonary resuscitation in accordance with the 
standards set forth by the American Red Cross or American 
Heart Association, or a person operating an automatic external 
defibrillator, who, voluntarily and gratuitously and other than in 
the ordinary course of such person’s employment or practice, 
renders emergency medical or professional assistance to a person 
in need thereof, shall not be liable to such person assisted for 
civil damages for any personal injuries which result from acts or 
omissions by such person in rendering the emergency care, 
which may constitute ordinary negligence. . . . The immunity 
provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions 
constituting gross, wilful [sic] or wanton negligence.108 
Apart from specifying the class of persons to whom it applies, the 
typical Good Samaritan immunity statute contains three basic re-
quirements—(1) the rendering of emergency care (2) in good faith 
and (3) gratuitously, i.e, without compensation or the expectation 
thereof—and an exception for grossly negligent, wanton, or willful 
misconduct.109 Many immunity statutes contain an additional re-
quirement concerning the location at which emergency care must be 
  
 107. HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.5(a) (2011). 
 108. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-557b(a) (2011). 
 109. Not all jurisdictions have incorporated all of these elements into their immunity statutes. Nebras-
ka, for example, has no good faith requirement or gross negligence exception. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 25-21,186 (LexisNexis 2012). At least six states have no requirement that care be rendered gratuitous-
ly. See 4 Med. Malpractice, supra note 43, at § 21.03 (2012). Note also that the Connecticut statute 
quoted in the main text has no good faith or scene of emergency requirement. 
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provided, e.g., that it be rendered “at the scene” of the emergency or 
accident110 or that it not be rendered in a hospital or other clinical 
facility.111 Further, many jurisdictions, either by statute or case law, 
impose an explicit requirement that, when a doctor or other profes-
sional claims the protection of the immunity, there have been no pre-
existing professional duty owed by the professional to the imperiled 
person or, equivalently, that the care not have been provided in the 
ordinary course of the professional’s employment or practice.112 
C. Application113 
Research for this Article identified 108 published cases featuring 
the application of a Good Samaritan immunity statute. This figure 
includes only cases applying “true” Good Samaritan immunity stat-
utes, i.e., statutes immunizing voluntary, gratuitous emergency 
care.114 The figure includes only civil actions in which the immunity 
is invoked by a defendant–rescuer as an affirmative defense to a tort 
action brought by an imperiled person claiming to have been injured 
as a result of the rescuer’s tortious conduct in performing the res-
cue.115 
  
 110. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-332(a) (2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-101(b) (2012); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 24-10-3 (2012). 
 111. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1799.102(a) (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 768.13(2)(a) (2012); see also Victoria Sutton, Is There a Doctor (and a Lawyer) in the House? Why 
Our Good Samaritans Laws Are Doing More Harm than Good for a National Public Health Security 
Strategy: A Fifty-State Survey, 6 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 261, 276–77 (2010); 4 Med. Malpractice, 
supra note 43, at § 21.03[2][b] (Sept. 2006). 
 112. See Reuter, supra note 97, at 161; Mason, supra note 96, at 144–46; Veilleux, supra note 12, 
§ 2.5. Notably, many states have immunity statutes protecting professionals for care rendered pursuant 
to a pre-existing professional duty or as part of the normal course of their employment. See, e.g., Sutton, 
supra note 111, at 278–79. 
 113. All the data presented in this section is based on a collection and summary of Good Samaritan 
immunity cases on file with the author. 
 114. The figure therefore excludes cases exclusively applying emergency medical provider immunity 
statutes with no requirement that the care have been provided gratuitously or without remuneration. See, 
e.g., Wright v. City of Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d 1190, 1193 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); Fuson v. City of Cin-
cinnati, 633 N.E.2d 612, 614 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). It includes, however, cases applying emergency 
medical provider immunity statutes that contain a requirement that the care have been provided without 
remuneration, even if it was clear from the facts of the case that the defendant provided emergency care 
as part of her professional duties. 
 115. The figure therefore excludes cases where the immunity was invoked under different circum-
 
25
Waisman: Negligence, Responsibility, and the Clumsy Samaritan: Is there a
Published by Reading Room, 2013
634 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:3 
In fifty-seven of the 108 cases, the immunity statute was deemed 
applicable and shielded the defendant from liability.116 In the other 
fifty-one cases, the court either expressly deemed the immunity inap-
plicable or refused to rule dispositively in the defendant’s favor based 
on the immunity (e.g., the court affirmed a denial or reversed a grant 
of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment).117 Seventy-eight 
of the 108 cases were decided on summary judgment.118 Nineteen 
were decided on a jury verdict or on a post-trial motion.119 The rest 
were decided on demurrer or at some other procedural phase.120 
Seventy-six of the 108 cases involved emergency care provided by 
a physician or other medical professional.121 More specifically, forty-
eight cases involved care provided by a physician, twenty-one in-
volved care provided by a paramedic or emergency medical techni-
cian, and seven involved care provided by some other type of medi-
cal professional (e.g., a nurse or dentist). Of the remaining thirty-two 
cases, seven involved care provided by a government employee (e.g., 
a member of the Coast Guard, a police officer, etc.) and twenty-four 
involved care provided by a private layperson. In one case, the identi-
ty of the rescuer was not clear from the opinion.122 Of the forty-eight 
cases involving physicians, the immunity was ruled applicable in 
  
stances. See,e.g., Maynard v. Ferno-Washington, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1174–77 (E.D. Wash. 1998) 
(immunity invoked by non-rescuing defendant against employee-rescuer’s negligence claim); Klvana v. 
California, 911 F. Supp 1288, 1298 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (immunity invoked in criminal action); Hutton v. 
Logan, 566 S.E.2d 782, 785 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (plaintiff asserted immunity to defend herself from a 
contributory negligence claim). 
 116. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Keck, 861 N.Y.S.2d 516, 518 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (holding that de-
fendant was entitled to immunity under state’s Good Samaritan statute). 
 117. See, e.g., Gragg v. Neurological Assocs., 263 S.E.2d 496, 497–98 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (finding 
immunity inapplicable because the situation did not constitute an accident or emergency as required by 
the statute); Velazquez ex rel. Velazquez v. Jiminez, 763 A.2d 753, 774 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2000) (finding immunity inapplicable where defendant responds to an emergency in a hospital). 
 118. See, e.g., Neal v. Yang, 816 N.E.2d 853, 861 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (affirming trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment). 
 119. See, e.g., Hamburger v. Henry Ford Hosp., 284 N.W.2d 155, 156 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (jury 
verdict for plaintiff). 
 120. See, e.g., Ferrell v. Minden Family Care Ctr., 704 So. 2d 969, 972 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (directing 
verdict for one defendant at the close of evidence). 
 121. See, e.g., Colby v. Schwartz, 144 Cal. Rptr. 624, 624 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (analyzing immunity 
asserted by multiple physician defendants). 
 122. See Markman v. Kotler, 382 N.Y.S.2d 522 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976). 
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thirty, or nearly two-thirds. By contrast, of the twenty-four cases in-
volving laypersons, the immunity was ruled applicable in just seven, 
or less than one-third. 
In fifty-eight of the 108 cases, the emergency care was provided in 
a hospital (forty-two cases, immunity ruled applicable in twenty-
four) or other clinical setting (sixteen cases, immunity ruled applica-
ble in eight). In the remaining fifty cases, the care was provided in a 
non-clinical setting (forty-eight cases) or in a combination of clinical 
and non-clinical settings (two cases). 
D. Criticism 
Perhaps the most pervasive—and certainly the most damning—
criticism of the Good Samaritan immunity is that it has failed in its 
primary mission of encouraging people to volunteer in emergen-
cies.123 This criticism cuts to the heart of the immunity’s instrumental 
rationale. If, in fact, the immunity is not (at least at the margin) mak-
ing willing rescuers of people who would otherwise have been by-
standers, it is not clear what purpose it could serve other than perhaps 
protecting the rescuer’s fairness interests. 
One basis for this criticism is that the key elements of the immuni-
ty—particularly the good faith, emergency care, and gratuitous care 
requirements—are too vague to send a clear message to potential 
plaintiffs that, in any particular case, the rescuer whose conduct is at 
issue is likely to avoid liability. For the immunity to succeed in en-
couraging emergency aid, the perceived likelihood of nonliability has 
to be strong enough to regularly discourage potential plaintiffs from 
filing suit, since even the prospect of being named in a malpractice 
action may be sufficient to deter doctors from intervening in an 
emergency.124 The vagueness of the immunity’s elements is thought 
  
 123. See, e.g., Mapel & Weigel, supra note 96, at 354; Brandt, supra note 89; Note, supra note 92, at 
1311–12; Helminski, supra note 80, at 232; Mason, supra note 96, at 1459; Oberstein, supra note 80, at 
822. 
 124. See, e.g., Reuter, supra note 97, at 158 & n.6. 
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to dilute the potential plaintiff’s certainty that the rescuer could satis-
fy them, thereby encouraging the filing of a lawsuit.125 
Given these concerns, it is somewhat surprising that there appears 
to have been very little empirical study of the immunity’s instrumen-
tal effectiveness. Still, the empirical studies that have been done tend 
to corroborate scholars’ skepticism about the immunity’s instrumen-
tal efficacy.126 The literature mentions just two studies of the efficacy 
of the Good Samaritan immunity in encouraging emergency assis-
tance, both surveys of physicians.127 One survey was conducted by 
the Law Department of the American Medical Association in 1963, 
at which time roughly two-thirds of the states had enacted Good Sa-
maritan immunity legislation.128 It showed that the immunity effected 
an essentially negligible (1%) increase in the reported willingness of 
doctors to offer emergency assistance as compared with doctors in 
states with no immunity legislation in force.129 Interestingly, the sur-
vey also showed that the presence of Good Samaritan immunity leg-
islation caused a significantly larger decrease in the willingness of 
doctors to offer emergency assistance as compared with doctors in 
states in which no immunity legislation had been introduced.130 Ar-
guably, this suggests that the very introduction of immunity legisla-
tion in a state’s legislature may bring the possibility of Good Samari-
  
 125. Note, supra note 92, at 1311–12; see also Mapel & Weigel, supra note 96, at 338–39; Sutton, 
supra note 111, at 292–93. 
 126. See, e.g., Neil L. Chayet, This Summer in Samaria, EMERGENCY MED., June 1971, at 161; Law 
Dep’t of the Am. Med. Ass’n, 1963 Professional-Liability Survey, 189 JAMA 859 (1964). 
 127. See Chayet, supra note 126; Law Dep’t of the Am. Med. Ass’n, supra note 126. 
 128. Law Dep’t of the Am. Med. Ass’n, supra note 126, at 865. Respondents were asked, “Does fear 
of a claim make you unwilling to furnish emergency medical care, away from your office or hospital, to 
a stranger injured in an accident or stricken with a sudden illness?” Id. Of physicians in states that had 
enacted immunity legislation at the time of the survey, 50.0% responded in the affirmative, 47.1% 
responded in the negative, and 2.9% chose not to answer the question. Id. Of physicians in states that 
had not enacted such legislation at the time of the survey, 50.5% responded affirmatively, 46.1% nega-
tively, and 3.4% did not answer the question. Id. Interestingly, the lowest affirmative response rate—
45.4%—came from physicians in states in which immunity legislation had not yet been introduced, 
while the highest affirmative response rate—52.5%—came from physicians in states in which immunity 
legislation had been introduced but rejected. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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tan liability into the public consciousness, thereby exacerbating the 
very fear it seeks to allay. 
The other survey, mentioned without a supporting citation in a 
1971 article in Emergency Medicine, reportedly showed that the im-
munity had a similarly negligible effect on the willingness of doctors 
to offer assistance in emergencies.131 According to the author of the 
article, when the survey was administered prior to the enactment of 
immunity legislation in the state in question, exactly 50% of the re-
spondents said they would stop to render assistance at the scene of an 
automobile accident or some other type of accident.132 When the sur-
vey was administered after the state had enacted immunity legisla-
tion, 49% of the respondents reported being willing to stop and offer 
assistance.133 
III. THE VOLUNTEER RESCUER AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
In this section, I turn to a critique of the rationale for the volunteer 
rescuer doctrine and, by implication, of the hypothesis that the Good 
Samaritan immunity can be justified as a vindication of the rescuer’s 
fairness interests. I make four related points: (1) the rationale courts 
have offered for the volunteer rescuer doctrine is inadequate, or at 
least incomplete; (2) a general corrective justice rationale for negli-
gence liability can justify the volunteer rescuer doctrine, but only if 
that rationale is understood to rest on the negligent actor’s responsi-
bility for the harm she has caused rather than the actor’s culpability in 
connection with the harm; (3) the notion of risk ownership, which is 
central to responsibility-based accounts, helps to explain the intuition 
that liability is appropriate from the standpoint of corrective justice in 
cases where the volunteer rescuer has, through her negligence, placed 
the imperiled person in a worse position than she would have been in 
  
 131. Chayet, supra note 126. This survey should not be given great weight as the Emergency Medi-
cine article does not report who conducted it or where it was published, if at all. Moreover, by the au-
thor’s description, the survey reported responses of physicians from just a single state. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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had the rescuer declined to intervene; and (4) the beneficent nature of 
the volunteer rescuer’s intervention becomes relevant to the question 
of risk ownership only where the rescuer has not increased the risk of 
harm to the imperiled person or otherwise placed her in a worse posi-
tion than she would have been in had the rescuer declined to inter-
vene. In such circumstances, fairness considerations provide a suffi-
cient basis for exempting the rescuer from liability provided the res-
cuer is a layperson and has acted in good faith and without reckless-
ness. 
Two conclusions follow, one practical and the other theoretical. 
First, the Good Samaritan immunity cannot be justified from a non-
instrumental, fairness standpoint except in narrow circumstances. If, 
as many have argued, the oft-stated instrumental justification for the 
immunity fails, then the immunity is essentially a law in search of a 
purpose. Second, my analysis presents a challenge to the view, taken 
by some corrective justice theorists, that the obligation to repair a 
negligently caused injury derives from a morally culpable attribute of 
the negligent act, e.g., that it evinces disrespect for the injured per-
son’s physical security. Because, in the paradigm case, the volunteer 
rescuer acts selflessly and out of a profound respect for the physical 
integrity of the imperiled person, the intuition that liability may nev-
ertheless be appropriate if the rescuer fails to exercise reasonable care 
supports a competing view of the moral basis for negligence liability: 
that the obligation to repair a negligently inflicted injury rests not on 
the injurer’s culpable disposition toward other agents, but on the in-
jurer’s responsibility for the consequences of his dangerous, even if 
non-culpable, conduct. 
A. The Inadequate Rationale Offered By Courts 
Let us begin by discussing the rationale that courts themselves 
have most frequently offered for the volunteer rescuer doctrine. That 
rationale rests on the observation that, once a person undertakes to 
aid another in peril, other potential rescuers may refrain from doing 
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so in the expectation that help is on the way.134 Thus, “a clumsy res-
cue attempt may have interfered with a competent rescue by someone 
else.”135 On this rationale, the purpose of imposing liability on a neg-
ligent volunteer rescuer seems to be twofold: to compensate the im-
periled person for losing out on the non-negligent aid that may have 
been forthcoming from another source and to deter intervention by 
persons who are likely not up to the task of providing competent aid 
when other, more capable persons stand ready to assist. Accordingly, 
courts have, in a number of cases, determined whether to impose 
negligence liability under the volunteer rescuer doctrine by inquiring 
whether the volunteer rescuer’s actions precluded or discouraged in-
tervention by others.136 
This rationale has serious limitations, however. Although it is of-
ten described as underlying the volunteer rescuer doctrine generally, 
courts have, as a rule, relied on it only in admiralty cases where the 
rescuer’s only alleged wrongdoing was a negligent failure to reach or 
locate the imperiled person in time to provide assistance.137 The ra-
  
 134. See, e.g., Cuyler v. United States, 362 F.3d 949, 953–54 (7th Cir. 2004); Jackson v. City of 
Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983); Lacey v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 219, 220 (D. Mass. 
1951); see also Brandt, supra note 89, at 305; cf. Warren A. Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promis-
es or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV. 913, 919 (1951). 
 135. Stockberger v. United States, 332 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Cuyler, 362 F.3d at 
953–54. 
 136. See, e.g., United States v. DeVane, 306 F.2d 182, 185, 187 (5th Cir. 1962) (finding evidence of 
position-worsening negligence where the Coast Guard’s erroneous assurance of the imperiled ship’s 
safety caused at least one other potential rescuer to refrain from coming to the ship’s aid); United States 
v. Gavagan, 280 F.2d 319, 328–29 (5th Cir. 1960) (finding Coast Guard worsened position of crew of 
imperiled shrimping vessel by deterring other potential rescuers from “taking action which, in all proba-
bility, would have been successful”); Daley v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 1005, 1010 (D. Mass. 1980) 
(noting in dicta that Coast Guard’s delay in starting search, even if negligent, could not serve as basis 
for Good Samaritan liability because there were no other possible rescuers who, as a result of the Coast 
Guard’s undertaking, desisted from intervening); Lacey, 98 F. Supp. at 220 (“That the Government does 
not come within the Good Samaritan rule is demonstrated by the fact that the complaint does not show 
that the Coast Guard’s rescue attempt reached the stage where other would-be rescuers were induced to 
cease their efforts in the belief that the Coast Guard had the situation in hand.”); David v. S. Farm Bu-
reau Cas. Ins. Co., 122 So. 2d 691, 696 (La. Ct. App. 1960) (noting defendant did not “exclude in any 
manner any other person present from accompanying him on the mission”). But see City of Joliet, 715 
F.2d at 1203 (noting in dicta that complaint may have stated a valid claim for negligence under the 
volunteer rescuer doctrine because “with a policeman and firemen at the scene of the accident, no mo-
torist was likely to assist the occupants of Ross’s burning car—especially when the police officer was 
directing them away from the scene.”). 
 137. See, e.g., DeVane, 306 F.2d at 185 (negligent delay in starting search due to erroneous interpreta-
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tionale seems inconsistent with cases in which courts, without deter-
mining whether the rescuer’s actions precluded intervention by oth-
ers, indicated a willingness to impose Good Samaritan liability on the 
basis that the rescuer increased the risk of harm to the imperiled per-
son138 or induced the imperiled person to rely, to her detriment, on 
the rescuer’s assistance.139 And it seems particularly difficult to rec-
oncile with cases where the court held the rescuer liable for negli-
gence even though, at the precise time the rescuer chose to intervene, 
there were no alternative sources of aid available.140 Likely for these 
  
tion of telephone message relating to status of imperiled vessel); Gavagan, 280 F.2d at 321–22, 328–29 
(negligent failure to locate imperiled vessel); Daley, 499 F. Supp. at 1010 (negligent delay in starting 
search and negligent failure to locate imperiled persons once search had begun); Lacey, 98 F. Supp. at 
219 (negligent failure to reach plane that had crashed into ocean). But see Frank v. United States, 250 
F.2d 178, 178–80 (3d Cir. 1957) (concluding Coast Guard’s failure to reach a drowning man in time to 
save him had not worsened his position for purposes of the Good Samaritan rule without analyzing 
whether the Coast Guard’s actions had precluded or discouraged intervention by others). 
 138. See, e.g., Sarracino v. Martinez, 870 P.2d 155, 156–57 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (reversing sum-
mary judgment for the defendant where, after driving intoxicated plaintiff around in her truck late at 
night, defendant left plaintiff alone in the truck in the parking lot of a bar, where she was subsequently 
attacked); Atkinson v. Stateline Hotel Casino & Resort, 21 P.3d 667, 673 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (denying 
summary judgment for defendant hotel where hotel employee took charge of severely intoxicated plain-
tiff and delivered her to the hotel room of a man who falsely claimed to be staying with her and then 
raped her); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 cmt. c (1965) (“A is run over by an 
automobile and left lying in the street. B, seeing A’s helpless condition, takes him in his car for the 
purpose of taking him to a hospital. B drives the car so negligently that he runs into a tree. The collision 
greatly increases A’s original injuries. B is subject to liability to A for so much of the harm to him as is 
due to the collision.”). 
 139. See, e.g., United States v. Sandra & Dennis Fishing Corp., 372 F.2d 189, 195 (1st Cir. 1967) 
(affirming denial of government’s exoneration petition where, due to a faulty loran, a Coast Guard 
patrol boat towed a fishing vessel, which had lost its rudder but was otherwise safe, onto a shoal, where 
it later sank along with members of its crew, and reasoning that “the Coast Guard led the [fishing vessel] 
to believe that the [Coast Guard patrol boat] was reasonably capable of performing the task”). Notably, 
although the court in this case concluded that the Coast Guard worsened the vessel’s position by induc-
ing detrimental reliance, towing the vessel onto the shoal seems clearly to have increased the risk of 
harm to the vessel’s crew, as at least one other court has recognized. Fondow v. United States, 112 F. 
Supp. 2d 119, 130 (D. Mass. 2000) (construing Sandra & Dennis Fishing Corp. as an instance of a 
rescuer making a situation worse by “increasing the risk of harm to the person in peril”). 
 140. See, e.g., United States v. Lawter, 219 F.2d 559, 562 n.1 (5th Cir. 1955) (holding Coast Guard 
liable for negligence under the volunteer rescuer doctrine where Coast Guard helicopter crew undertook 
rescue at a time when “[t]here were no boats or vessels nearby to rescue” four shipwreck victims and the 
crew performed the rescue ineptly, resulting in one of the victims falling to her death from a helicopter 
cable); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 cmt. e (1965) (“Clear authority is lacking, but 
it is possible that a court may hold that one who has thrown rope to a drowning man, pulled him half 
way to shore, and then unreasonably abandoned the effort and left him to drown, is liable even though 
there were no other possible sources of aid, and the situation is made no worse than it was.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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reasons, at least one court has deemed the precluding-rescue-by-
others rationale “strained.”141 The principal value of the rationale 
seems to be to show that, even where it may seem that the rescuer’s 
negligence resulted only in a failure to improve the imperiled per-
son’s situation, if the rescuer somehow precluded or discouraged oth-
er potential rescuers from intervening, then the rescuer effectively did 
leave the imperiled person worse off than she would have been had 
the rescuer refrained from intervening altogether. 
So it appears that the general rationale courts have offered for the 
volunteer rescuer doctrine is, in fact, insufficiently general. It justifies 
liability only where the rescuer has worsened the position of the im-
periled person by deterring or precluding other potential rescuers 
from intervening. It does not adequately justify liability where the 
rescuer has worsened the imperiled person’s position by affirmatively 
increasing the risk of harm because courts have been willing to im-
pose liability in such cases without considering how the negligent 
rescuer’s actions affected the behavior of other potential rescuers.142 
More fundamentally, it fails to explain why it is ever appropriate to 
hold the volunteer rescuer liable for negligence in conducting the 
rescue. As discussed above, such an explanation seems necessary 
because of the persistent intuition that it is, in some sense, unfair to 
penalize the volunteer rescuer for her ineptitude in performing the 
rescue, particularly in light of the common law’s lenient treatment of 
the non-acting bystander. 
B. Corrective Justice: Culpability v. Responsibility 
If the precluding-rescue-by-others rationale is inadequate, what al-
ternative rationale might support the volunteer rescuer doctrine? Giv-
en that my ultimate interest in posing this question is to determine 
whether the Good Samaritan immunity can be justified on a non-
instrumental basis (i.e., fairness), I am going to ignore, for the pur-
poses of this Article, the possible instrumental justifications for the 
  
 141. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d at 1203. 
 142. See cases cited infra notes 138–40. 
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volunteer rescuer doctrine. I will not consider, for example, whether 
the doctrine can be justified on efficiency grounds, i.e., as an instru-
ment for inducing volunteer rescuers to use an optimal level of care 
in conducting the rescue. I will instead focus on the prominent cor-
rective justice rationales for negligence liability generally. I will ask 
whether, in the paradigm case of voluntary rescue, these rationales 
would seem to apply with their usual force. If they do, I take this to 
suggest that the intuition that the volunteer rescuer doctrine is, in 
some sense, unfair to the rescuer may be mistaken, at least in certain 
cases. If they do not, I take this to vindicate the intuition, perhaps 
confirming the existence of a non-instrumental, fairness-based ra-
tionale for the Good Samaritan immunity. 
My underlying assumption in proceeding in this manner is that, as 
Jules Coleman has put it, corrective justice theory specifies what 
fairness requires in allocating the costs of losses owing to human 
agency.143 In other words, when one person has been injured by an-
other, the work of corrective justice theory is to specify when it is fair 
for the injurer to be held responsible for the victim’s loss. Given this 
close relationship between fairness and corrective justice, one can 
test whether and to what extent the volunteer rescuer doctrine is un-
fair by asking whether and to what extent, in a case where an already-
imperiled person is injured by her would-be rescuer, corrective jus-
tice considerations support liability. 
Before examining the corrective justice rationales for negligence 
liability, it will be helpful to make clear that, following the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts, I understand negligence as a failure to “exer-
cise reasonable care under all the circumstances.”144 I take the deter-
mination of whether a particular actor exercised reasonable care in a 
particular situation to rest both on a common sense inquiry into how 
  
 143. See Coleman, supra note 15, at 203–04 (“The principle of corrective justice—that each of us has 
a duty to repair the wrongful losses for which we are responsible—specifies the content of fairness by 
articulating relationships among concepts central to the idea of fairness, concepts of loss, responsibility, 
and repair.”). But see Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Acci-
dents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 221–22 (2000) (arguing that fairness considerations are native to distribu-
tive, rather than corrective, justice). 
 144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (2010). 
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a reasonably careful person would have acted under the circumstanc-
es and the balancing test embodied in the Learned Hand formula—
i.e., a measurement of the “foreseeable likelihood that the person’s 
conduct will result in harm [and] the foreseeable severity of any harm 
that may ensue” against “the burden of precautions to eliminate or 
reduce the risk of harm.”145 These inquiries represent alternative and 
complementary ways of asking whether the conduct in question met 
the applicable standard of care. Whether an actor exercised due care 
depends both on a common sense assessment of how the average rea-
sonable person would have acted under the circumstance, as well as 
on a comparison between the magnitude of the risk posed by the neg-
ligent actor’s conduct and the cost to the actor of taking a precaution 
that would have removed or lessened that risk. As the Restatement 
notes, this conception is flexible enough to accommodate both inad-
vertent negligence—a failure to recognize a risk one should have 
recognized as being created by one’s conduct—and advertent negli-
gence—a failure to appreciate that a risk one recognized oneself to be 
creating was unjustifiable under the circumstances.146 The common 
sense inquiry may feature more prominently in the case of inadvert-
ent negligence whereas the balancing approach may be more useful 
where the actor adverts to the risk imposed by his conduct.147 
The corrective justice rationale for tort liability rests on the axiom 
that a person who has wrongfully harmed another has a duty to repair 
the harm.148 One key feature of corrective justice theory is its retro-
  
 145. Id. For purposes of this Article, I take no position on the appropriate interpretation of the Hand 
formula. I leave unaddressed, for example, questions about whether the rationality-based interpretation 
implicit in economic theories of negligence liability is preferable to the reasonableness-based interpreta-
tion offered by commentators like Gregory Keating. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution 
Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 655–59 (2003) (contrasting these two 
interpretations); see also Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 311 (1996). 
 146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. k 
(2010). 
 147. See id. 
 148. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 361 (1992) (“A loss falls within the ambit of 
corrective justice only if it is wrongful. Losses are wrongful if they result from either wrongdoing, that 
is, unjustifiable departures from the relevant standards of permissible behavior or, wrongs, that is, inva-
sions of rights. Corrective justice responds to such losses by imposing on individuals a duty to repair 
them.”); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 695 (2003) 
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spective orientation.149 Corrective justice theory holds that cases 
should be decided and legal rules determined from an ex post stand-
point, asking what legal rule or outcome represents the most appro-
priate way of rectifying a harm that has already occurred.150 In the 
context of negligence, corrective justice theory holds that where one 
person imposes an unjustifiable risk of harm on another and the risk 
materializes in injury, the injurer has wrongfully harmed the victim 
and therefore owes the victim a duty to repair the harm.151 
Most corrective justice theorists would presumably agree on these 
principles (or some version of them). The consensus dissolves, how-
ever, when it comes to specifying the precise sense in which negli-
gent conduct is supposed to be wrongful. At this point, corrective 
justice theorists divide roughly into two camps.152 Theorists in one 
camp take the view that negligent conduct itself constitutes moral 
wrongdoing that makes the negligent actor at least minimally morally 
culpable.153 Within this camp, some theorists view negligent conduct 
as morally wrongful on consequentialist grounds, whereas others 
view it as wrongful on non-consequentialist, deontological 
grounds.154 Theorists in the other camp reject the notion that negli-
gence necessarily involves morally culpable wrongdoing but hold 
that negligence can nevertheless give rise to a moral responsibility 
  
(“Corrective justice theory is based on a simple and elegant idea: when one person has been wrongfully 
injured by another, the injurer must make the injured party whole.”); see also Jules Coleman & Gabriel 
Mendlow, Theories of Tort Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., 3.1 (Aug. 26, 2010), pla-
to.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/tort-theories/. 
 149. Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 273, 282 
(1996). 
 150. This stands in contrast to instrumental theories of tort liability, which are fundamentally forward-
looking in their orientation. Such theories, like the efficiency theory of tort liability advanced by law-
and-economics theorists, ask what legal rule or outcome will cause actors behaving with knowledge of 
such rules and outcomes to behave in the optimal (i.e., wealth-maximizing or welfare-maximizing) 
manner. 
 151. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 6 cmt. d (2010); COLEMAN, supra note 148, at 332; WEINRIB, supra note 23, at 145–70; Keating, 
supra note 143, at 221–22. 
 152. Compare WEINRIB, supra note 23, at 152–53, with Perry, Responsibility, supra note 25, at 72, 
73. 
 153. See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 23, at 152–53. 
 154. See Perry, Responsibility, supra note 25, at 72–75. 
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for any resulting injury.155 On this view, while negligent conduct that 
results in injury to another may not itself be morally culpable, it is 
wrongful in the sense that it violates a right. When A negligently in-
jures B, A violates B’s right to remain free of harms owing to anoth-
er’s failure to exercise due care.156 On the responsibility-based view, 
due to her failure to conform her conduct to the applicable objective 
standard, the negligent actor in some sense “owns” the harmful out-
come, has a moral obligation to repair the harm caused by her negli-
gent act, and, should she fail to comply with that obligation, will 
have then done something morally culpable. 
My basic claim is that samarital negligence liability, at least in the 
paradigm case where a volunteer rescuer acts diligently, wholeheart-
edly, and in good faith to bring the imperiled person to safety, cannot 
be supported by the moral culpability view. This shows one of two 
things: either there should be no liability for samarital negligence in 
such cases or culpability-based versions of the corrective justice ra-
tionale for negligence liability are deficient in not being able to ac-
count for the intuition that, in certain circumstances, volunteer rescu-
ers should be held liable for their negligence in conducting the res-
cue. 
I argue that the latter proposition is correct and that responsibility-
based versions of the corrective justice rationale for negligence liabil-
ity can better explain why samarital negligence liability is appropri-
ate from the standpoint of corrective justice. In my view, this counts 
as a point in favor of responsibility-based versions of the corrective 
justice rationale for negligence liability and one against culpability-
based accounts. 
It is somewhat surprising that culpability-based versions of the 
corrective justice rationale for negligence liability have persisted 
among respected scholars given the widely held view that tort liabil-
  
 155. See id. at 72, 73; Perry, Moral Foundations, supra note 25, at 496–512. 
 156. See Coleman & Mendlow, supra note 148, at 3.1 (“For a loss to be wrongful in the relevant 
sense, it need not be one for which the wrongdoer is morally to blame. It need only be a loss incident to 
the violation of the victim’s right not to be injured—a right correlative to the wrongdoer’s first-order 
duty not to injure.”). 
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ity generally is not concerned with the moral blameworthiness or 
praiseworthiness of the defendant’s actions.157 But, as we will see 
shortly, persisted they have. 
One might think that, in light of the inarguable fact that negligence 
liability is assessed on an objective basis without taking account of 
the actor’s character, capacities, or mental state, culpability-based 
versions of the corrective justice rationale for negligence liability 
would have to rest on consequentialist grounds. Given that a person 
can be deemed legally negligent despite being of excellent moral 
character and making their best efforts to anticipate relevant risks and 
take appropriate precautions (i.e., to conform their behavior to the 
objective standard of conduct applicable under the circumstances), it 
would seem that the most promising basis for arguing that negligent 
conduct is immoral conduct is to construe morality strictly in terms 
of the good and bad outcomes resulting from a given action. There 
does, after all, seem to be a straightforward sense in which negligent 
conduct is morally wrongful from a consequentialist point of view.158 
However, few such accounts have, to my knowledge, been offered.159 
To the contrary, most culpability-based versions of the corrective 
justice rationale for negligence liability have rested on deontological 
  
 157. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 148, at 219 (“Fault liability in torts, especially liability for 
negligence . . . does not require culpability or moral blameworthiness. Blameless agents can be held 
liable in torts; and fault can be the basis of their liability. Fault liability may be liability without 
blame.”); Gerald J. Postema, Introduction: Search for an Explanatory Theory of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY 
AND THE LAW OF TORTS 1, 3 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) (“Tort law appears to be utterly indifferent 
to the culpability of the injurer.”); Richard W. Wright, The Standards of Care in Negligence Law, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 249, 258 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (advocating Kantian 
position that, in tort actions, liability hinges on an assessment of the defendant’s “moral responsibility 
for having adversely affected someone else’s person or property” rather than on the “moral blamewor-
thiness or merit of the defendant’s . . . conduct”). 
 158. See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 271 (1996) (“If it 
is wrong to do more harm than good in the arena in which deontological maxims do not apply, then it 
would appear culpable to do an act under circumstances in which the discounted value of the harm that 
act will cause exceeds the costs of precautions that it would take to prevent that harm.”). 
 159. See id. at 270, 271 (taking the position that “negligence cannot be construed as deontologically 
wrongful” and that “to be negligent is to act culpably with regard to causing consequential wrongs—
wrongs that are not of deontological consequence, but wrongs that any deontologist can and should 
regard as of significant moral importance”); see also Simons, supra note 149, at 282 (discussing, but 
ultimately rejecting, an “attenuated” consequentialist rationale for negligence liability whereby “the law 
essentially grants the victim a corrective justice right not to suffer at the hands of a ‘wrongdoer,’ defined 
as one who has failed to maximize the consequences of his actions”). 
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grounds, i.e., that it lies in the intrinsic nature of negligent conduct to 
violate some deontological norm.160 
One such view is that negligent conduct is morally wrongful be-
cause it violates the deontological norm of impartiality.161 The draft-
ers of Restatement (Third) of Torts explicitly embrace this view in a 
comment concerning the “[r]ationales” for negligence liability: 
One justification for imposing liability for negligent conduct that 
causes physical harm is corrective justice; imposing liability 
remedies an injustice done by the defendant to the plaintiff. An 
actor who permits conduct to impose a risk of physical harm on 
others that exceeds the burden the actor would bear in avoiding 
that risk impermissibly ranks personal interests ahead of the in-
terests of others. This, in turn, violates an ethical norm of equal 
consideration when imposing risks on others. Imposing liability 
remedies this violation.162 
And the drafters of Restatement (Second) of Torts clearly had impar-
tiality in mind as well, stating in a comment concerning “weighing 
interests” that negligence law 
Requires . . . that the actor . . . give an impartial consideration to 
the harm likely to be done the interests of the other as compared 
with the advantages likely to accrue to his own interests, free 
from the natural tendency of the actor, as a party concerned, to 
prefer his own interests to those of others.163 
In addition to the drafters of the Restatement, at least one other 
commentator appears to have endorsed a deontological rationale for 
negligence liability that centers on impartiality.164 On this view, my 
  
 160. See WEINRIB, supra note 23, at 152–53. 
 161. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 6 cmt. d 
(2010). 
 162.  Id. 
 163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. e (1965). 
 164. See Simons, supra note 149, at 282 (opining that one “plausible” nonconsequentialist justifica-
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failure to take a precaution which, though it imposes some cost on 
me, protects someone else from a harm that would impose a greater 
cost on them, is morally objectionable because it evinces a failure to 
consider others’ interests as equal in value to my own. 
So, is imposing liability on the volunteer rescuer—who negligently 
injures the person he is trying to help—justifiable on the basis that, in 
doing so, the rescuer has exhibited an impermissible degree of par-
tiality to his own interests? It is not. Samarital negligence may be the 
example par excellence of negligent conduct that does not violate the 
deontological norm of impartiality. Can the volunteer rescuer’s neg-
ligent conduct really be said to derive from the rescuer having con-
sidered her own interests more important than those of the imperiled 
person? The entire rescue effort is ostensibly founded on, and moti-
vated by, a concern for the imperiled person’s welfare. While the 
authenticity of such concern might be questioned in cases where the 
rescuer has been grossly negligent or reckless in conducting the res-
cue, ordinary negligence does not seem incompatible with it. Unlike 
many types of non-samarital negligence, samarital negligence typi-
cally does not involve what could be called an act of selfishness. The 
very decision to offer assistance to the imperiled person, though one 
has no legal obligation to do so, seems to rest on a selfless concern 
for that person’s well-being and a desire to do something to promote 
that person’s interests, setting one’s own interests to the side. Rather 
than deriving from a failure to be impartial in one’s practical deliber-
ations, creating an unjustifiable risk in such a situation could plausi-
bly have resulted from a miscalculation about how best to bring the 
imperiled person to safety or a mistake in attempting to do so. 
The case of Swenson v. Waseca Mutual Insurance Co., nicely il-
lustrates this point.165 In Swenson, thirteen-year-old Kelly Swenson 
dislocated her knee when the snowmobile she was riding struck a 
  
tion for negligence liability is “a Kantian conception of cost-benefit analysis, which requires actors to 
give impartial consideration to the interests of others in deciding how to act”); see also Ariel Porat, The 
Many Faces of Negligence, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 105, 106 (2003) (describing “Kantian account 
of tort liability” under which “the negligent injurer failed in that he immorally preferred his own inter-
ests to the interests of the victim”). 
 165. Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
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drainage culvert alongside a highway.166 Swenson’s companions 
waved down a passing motorist, Lillian Tiegs, who agreed to take 
Swenson to the hospital.167 After Swenson boarded Tiegs’s van, 
Tiegs attempted to make a U-turn onto the opposite side of the high-
way.168 Before Tiegs had completed the U-turn, a tractor-trailer trav-
elling at an estimated seventy miles per hour in a fifty-five-mile-per-
hour zone struck the passenger side of Tiegs’s vehicle.169 Swenson 
died from the injuries she sustained in the collision.170 The court held 
Tiegs immune from liability under Minnesota’s Good Samaritan im-
munity statute.171 Suppose it could be established that Tiegs began to 
make the U-turn without checking to see if another vehicle were ap-
proaching on the opposite side of the road.172 Suppose further that, 
had she looked, she would have seen the tractor-trailer and, conse-
quently, delayed making the turn until it passed. Now, it seems clear 
that, in failing to check the road for other vehicles, the rescuer “im-
pose[d] a risk of physical harm on others that exceeds the burden 
  
 166. Id. at 795. 
 167. Id. at 795–96. 
 168. Id. at 796. 
 169. Id. The published opinion notes only that the tractor-trailer was “exceeding the posted speed 
limit.” Id. The Respondent’s Brief in the Swenson case, however, states that “The investigating trooper, 
Brent Richter, opined that Johnson [the tractor-trailer driver] was traveling at approximately 70 miles 
per hour in a 55 mile per hour speed zone.” Respondent’s Brief at 3 Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 
653 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (No. C5-02-651). 
 170. Swenson, 653 N.W.2d at 796. 
 171. Id. at 800. After filing a wrongful death action against both the tractor-trailer driver and Tiegs, 
Swenson’s parents settled with both defendants. Id. at 796. According to the court, the Swensons then 
brought an “underinsured-motorist claim” against “the insurer for Tiegs.” Id. The Appellants’ Brief, 
however, makes clear the Swensons actually filed this claim against their own insurer, Waseca Mutual. 
Appellants’ Brief at 2, Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (No. 
C5-02-651). 
 172. This fact was not affirmatively established in Swenson, but, as the appellants noted in their brief, 
the circumstances strongly suggest that Tiegs failed to check the traffic on the opposite side of the 
highway before beginning her U-turn. Appellants’ Brief at 6, Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 
N.W.2d 794 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (No. C5-02-651) (“Just as [Johnson, the tractor-trailer driver] was 
about to pass the group, Ms. Tiegs suddenly and without looking or signaling her intentions turned from 
the shoulder directly into his lane.”). The Respondent’s Brief acknowledges that Tiegs “did not see” the 
tractor-trailer, and it does not suggest that Tiegs would not or could not have seen the tractor-trailer had 
she checked the road an instant before making her turn. Respondent’s Brief at 3, Swenson v. Waseca 
Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (No. C5-02-651). For the remainder of this Arti-
cle, and solely for purposes of my argument, I will assume Tiegs failed to check the road before begin-
ning the turn. 
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[she] would bear in avoiding that risk.”173 The risk was significant 
and the potential harm severe; the burden of taking the risk-avoiding 
precaution, on the other hand, was minimal. But can it really be said 
that the rescuer’s failure to check the road before making the U-turn 
resulted from her having “impermissibly rank[ed] personal interests 
ahead of the interests of others”?174 It is not at all clear what she per-
sonally stood to gain by neglecting to do so. Her failure to check the 
road, after all, created as serious (or nearly as serious) a risk of harm 
to herself as to her passenger. What makes the error in this case neg-
ligent is that it created (or increased) significant risks of serious harm 
that were avoidable at a minimal cost to the injurer. It does not fol-
low, however, that the failure to avoid creating or increasing those 
risks resulted from the injurer’s pursuit of her own interests at the 
expense of the interests of the other.175 By contrast, consider a classic 
case of non-samarital negligence such as that of the driver who, in an 
effort to arrive on time for a dinner party, causes a serious accident 
by significantly exceeding the legal speed limit. In that instance, 
there is a clear sense in which the driver’s negligent act seems to in-
  
 173. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 6 cmt. d 
(2010). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Cf. Porat, supra note 164, at 121–28 (discussing a category of negligence cases, which he takes 
to include many medical malpractice cases as well as voluntary rescue cases, in which “the injurer failed 
in balancing the different interests of the victim without taking into account any self-interest at all”). 
Porat argues that imposing liability in such cases “is not generally crucial and, at times, even detri-
mental,” basing this conclusion, in part, on his view that 
[i]n terms of ex post justice, it is apparent that the moral claim of a victim who was in-
jured due to the injurer’s disdain for her interest or due to the injurer’s inappropriate pref-
erence of his own interest over her interest . . . is stronger than the moral claim of a vic-
tim who was injured during an effort to act for her benefit or to improve her condition. 
Id. at 123. Porat here seems to conflate the injurer’s moral culpability in connection with the injury with 
the victim’s moral entitlement to compensation. Though I agree that it is “apparent” that an injurer’s 
moral culpability is generally greater where her negligence results from a failure of impartiality than 
where it results from a failure to properly balance the different interests of the victim, it does not neces-
sarily follow that the victim’s moral entitlement to compensation is any less in cases of the latter type. 
Porat would seem to owe an explanation of why, to use his own example, an emergency room patient 
who died as the result of a doctor’s unreasonable failure to conduct a complete examination in response 
to the patient’s complaint of severe chest pains has any less of a right to compensation where the doc-
tor’s failure resulted from a good-faith, but unreasonable, belief that the patient’s symptoms were caused 
by indigestion than where it resulted from the doctor’s wish to avoid being delayed and to save the 
hospital money. Id. at 124. 
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volve ranking his own interests (e.g., his interest in arriving sooner at 
his destination) ahead of the safety interests of other drivers. 
There may, of course, be cases where the volunteer rescuer, de-
spite having undertaken to assist an imperiled stranger to whom he 
owed no duty, performs the undertaking so callously or half-
heartedly as to suggest that he is not principally motivated by a con-
cern for the imperiled person’s welfare. For example, in Zelenko v. 
Gimbel Brothers, Inc., Mary Zelenko became ill in the defendant’s 
store.176 After undertaking to assist Zelenko, store personnel moved 
her to the store’s infirmary where she remained for six hours without 
any medical care.177 Zelenko later died.178 Denying the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss, the court noted, “If defendant had left plaintiff’s 
intestate alone, beyond doubt some bystander, who would be influ-
enced more by charity than by legalistic duty, would have summoned 
an ambulance. Defendant segregated this plaintiff’s intestate where 
such aid could not be given and then left her alone.”179 In such a case, 
the impartiality rationale may well apply. But the apparent inapplica-
bility of that rationale to at least some cases of samarital negligence 
seems to support the intuition that holding the volunteer rescuer lia-
ble for negligence in such cases is in some way fundamentally unfair. 
So far as the impartiality justification for negligence liability is con-
cerned, then, it seems that the intuition with which I began this Arti-
cle may be on to something. Perhaps one feels that it is unfair to hold 
the volunteer rescuer liable for negligence because one of the promi-
nent culpability-based corrective justice rationales for negligence 
liability—lack of impartiality—fails, it seems, to apply with its usual 
force. 
But there is another rationale that needs to be considered: one cen-
tering on the notion of respect. Some commentators maintain that 
negligent conduct is a form of wrongdoing because, as Gregory Keat-
  
 176. Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 287 N.Y.S. 134, 135 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1935). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 134. 
 179. Id. at 135. 
43
Waisman: Negligence, Responsibility, and the Clumsy Samaritan: Is there a
Published by Reading Room, 2013
652 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:3 
ing180 has put it, such conduct constitutes “the failure to act with suf-
ficient respect for the security of those endangered by one’s ac-
tions.”181 On this view, negligent conduct is morally objectionable 
not because I have, in acting negligently, ranked my own interests 
above those of another. It is rather that, even if my negligent act did 
not serve to promote my own interests in any meaningful way, it still 
evinced a failure to appropriately honor another person’s interest in 
their own physical integrity. Here is Keating’s fuller account of the 
wrongfulness of negligent conduct: 
Negligence is the failure to prevent a risk imposition that should 
have been prevented. . . . The imposition of a negligent risk ex-
presses inadequate respect for the security of the victim; it is an 
“affront to personality” in this sense. Those who negligently in-
jure others are therefore guilty of a kind of primary wrongdoing 
not present when reasonable conduct issues in injury. This link 
between negligence and disrespect makes negligence liability an 
instance of corrective justice in a robust sense: The duty to repair 
a negligently inflicted injury is a duty to make right a harm 
wrongly inflicted.182 
In the same vein, Keating later remarks: 
[N]egligence is a form of wrongful conduct—a failure to exhibit 
sufficient respect for the physical integrity and property of oth-
ers. Treating the lives, limbs, and property of others with insuffi-
cient respect is a form of mistreatment. Negligent injurers there-
fore cannot complain if they are made to repair the harm that 
  
 180. Because of Keating’s emphasis on distributive justice concerns, some have concluded that he is 
not a corrective justice theorist. See, e.g, Zipursky, supra note 148, at 699 n.18. However, at least with 
regard to negligence liability, corrective justice considerations retain an important place in Keating’s 
account. For example, although considerations of distributive justice constitute, for Keating, the primary 
rationale for negligence liability, he explicitly notes that “[c]onsiderations of corrective jus-
tice . . . supply a second justification for the duty of reparation that negligence law imposes on careless 
injurers.” Keating, supra note 143, at 222. 
 181. Keating, supra note 143, at 221. 
 182. Id. at 200–01. 
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their disrespect—their wrongdoing—has wrought.183 
Ernest Weinrib has advanced a similar account of the wrongfulness 
of negligence, one resting on the Kantian notion of self-determined 
agency: 
To refuse to mitigate the risk of one’s activity is to treat the 
world as a dumping ground for one’s harmful effects, as if it 
were uninhabited by other agents. . . . Under the Kantian princi-
ple of right, the position of each party must be consistent with 
the other’s being a self-determining agent. Accordingly, the 
plaintiff cannot demand that the law regard as wrongful the crea-
tion of all risk; such a judgment of wrongfulness would render 
action by the defendant impermissible, thus denying to the de-
fendant the status of agent. Similarly, the defendant cannot claim 
immunity regarding risks that could have been modulated; that 
claim would ignore the effect of one’s action on other agents and 
would treat them as nonexistent. When combined, these two 
considerations constitute a standard of care in which doer and 
sufferer rank equally as self-determining agents in judgments 
about the level of permissible risk creation.184 
For Weinrib, imposing an unjustifiable risk on another agent is 
wrongful in that it involves treating the other agent as though she 
does not exist.185 This is of a piece with Keating’s claim that negli-
gence is wrongful in that it expresses disrespect for the person whose 
physical security is thereby put at risk.186 The disrespect consists in 
acting as though there were no agent whose physical security is 
placed at risk by one’s conduct. 
This rationale holds the promise of better justifying liability for 
samarital negligence since it can explain why liability may be appro-
  
 183. Id. at 222. 
 184. WEINRIB, supra note 23, at 152. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Keating, supra note 143, at 222. 
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priate even where the injurer’s negligence did not result from exces-
sive self-preference. In a case like Swenson,187 there seems to be at 
least a prima facie sense in which the rescuer’s negligence evinces a 
failure to adequately take into account the victim’s physical security. 
After all, the rescuer in that case failed to take a very low-cost pre-
caution—ensuring the road was clear before making a U-turn—
which, had it been taken, would have greatly reduced the likelihood 
of an extremely costly harm befalling the victim.188 This alone might 
be thought to establish a lack of respect for the victim’s security. 
However, the case of samarital negligence places a significant de-
gree of pressure even on the inadequate respect rationale for negli-
gence liability. Like the impartiality rationale, the inadequate respect 
rationale premises negligence liability on a defect in the negligent 
actor’s attitude toward the agency of others, particularly toward the 
agency of those placed at risk by her conduct. On this view, negligent 
conduct is deemed wrongful—not in itself—but rather in virtue of 
what it, to use Keating’s terms, “expresses” or “exhibits” about the 
actor’s attitude toward the agency of others.189 A lack of sufficient 
respect is a defect in the agent’s comportment toward others as ex-
pressed by her conduct; not a defect in the conduct itself. Because of 
its attitudinal nature, the inadequate respect rationale must contem-
plate a more or less holistic assessment of the agent’s motives and 
intentions in acting negligently. The nature of the negligent act itself 
might be one important indicator of the actor’s attitude toward others, 
but it surely is not the only relevant indicator. The factual circum-
stances surrounding the negligent conduct would seem to be no less 
important, as might the actor’s beliefs, motives, and intentions. 
Claiming that the negligent volunteer rescuer’s actions evince a 
lack of respect for the victim’s security seems to violate this com-
mitment to holism since it evaluates the negligent act in a vacuum, 
separate from the beneficent context in which it occurs. A voluntary 
attempt to assist someone in dire peril, if it expresses anything about 
  
 187. Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
 188. Id. at 796. 
 189. Keating, supra note 143, at 200, 222. 
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the rescuer’s attitude towards the victim, expresses a profound con-
cern with and respect for the victim’s physical integrity. Where such 
an attempt is undertaken diligently and in good faith—that is, whole-
heartedly and with a genuine intention of benefitting the other per-
son—it seems a bit forced to characterize a negligent error committed 
in the course of the attempt as necessarily evincing inadequate re-
spect for the victim’s security. When, in performing the general 
course of conduct in which the negligent act occurred, the actor is 
motivated by true beneficence—a genuine concern for the welfare of 
another and a wholehearted willingness to act, voluntarily and gratui-
tously, on that concern, even at some cost to herself—both the inade-
quate respect and the impartiality rationales run into trouble because 
it seems inapt to premise liability on an attitudinal defect in the actor. 
In Swenson, the negligent act is embedded in a course of conduct 
that, by all appearances, is motivated by genuine beneficence.190 Far 
from treating the imperiled person as though she does not exist (à la 
Weinrib), the rescuer in that case acted in recognition of and with 
deference to the imperiled person’s interest in physical integrity. 
There is, of course, a clear sense in which a case like Zelenko is dif-
ferent.191 In that case, notwithstanding the rescuer’s having voluntari-
ly undertaken to assist the imperiled person, one can reasonably 
question whether the rescuer’s overall course of conduct—moving 
Zelenko to the infirmary and leaving her there without attention for 
several hours—expressed respect for her physical integrity.192 The 
facts suggest such a degree of callousness and inattentiveness as to 
make it implausible to characterize the rescuers’ negligence as con-
sisting merely in a mistake or miscalculation made in the course of a 
good-faith attempt to bring the imperiled person to safety. In a case 
like Swenson,193 however, the rescuer’s failure to use due care in one 
particular aspect of her conduct does not vitiate the sense that the 
rescuer’s general course of conduct expressed genuine respect for the 
  
 190. Swenson, 653 N.W.2d 794. 
 191. Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., 287 N.Y.S. 134 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1935). 
 192. Id. at 135. 
 193. Swenson, 653 N.W.2d 794. 
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imperiled person’s agency and physical integrity. Given that the res-
cuer’s general course of conduct undeniably expresses an attitude of 
profound respect for the victim’s physical integrity, it seems inappro-
priate to regard an inadvertent (and no doubt deeply regretted) mis-
take committed during that course of conduct as evidence that the 
agent harbors the diametrically opposite attitude. 
The inapplicability of the culpability-based rationales for negli-
gence liability apparently vindicates the intuition that it is unfair to 
impose liability on the volunteer rescuer for her ineptitude in per-
forming the rescue. If negligent conduct is wrongful in that it consti-
tutes a basis for deeming the agent herself, in at least some minimal 
sense, morally culpable, a volunteer rescuer’s ineptitude or clumsi-
ness in performing the rescue is usually not wrongful and, therefore, 
would not give rise to a moral obligation to repair any resulting inju-
ry. As we have seen, in the paradigm case of voluntary rescue, where 
the rescuer acts diligently and in good faith, attributing even a mini-
mal level of moral culpability to the rescuer as a result of her failure 
to exercise reasonable care seems problematic. Where the rescuer’s 
alleged negligence consists in a mistake or miscalculation made in 
the course of a wholehearted, good-faith attempt to bring the imper-
iled person to safety, it just seems wrong to claim that such negli-
gence evinces a failure of impartiality, a lack of respect for the im-
periled person’s agency, or some other attitudinal defect that serves 
as a basis for holding the rescuer morally culpable. 
However, there is another sort of corrective justice rationale for 
negligence liability that needs to be considered. On this view, while 
negligent conduct need not indicate an attitudinal defect in the actor 
and need not constitute a basis for deeming the actor herself morally 
culpable,194 it nevertheless gives rise to moral responsibility for the 
  
 194. As noted above, many commentators believe that negligent conduct need not be morally culpa-
ble. See, e.g., Peter Birks, The Concept of a Civil Wrong, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT 
LAW 29, 45 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (“Negligence consists in the breach of a duty of care to avoid 
damage. The duty is given content by the standard set by the notional reasonable man. . . . In practice 
the application of that standard is a very imperfect guide to the question whether a defendant was wor-
thy of blame, reproach, or revulsion.”); Wright, supra note 157, at 258 (advocating Kantian position 
that, in tort actions, liability hinges on an assessment of the defendant’s “moral responsibility for having 
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harmful outcome. Whereas culpability-based accounts view negligent 
conduct as wrongful by dint of what it (necessarily) reveals about the 
injurer’s attitude toward other agents, the responsibility-based ac-
count views such conduct as wrongful solely in virtue of its failure to 
conform to the standard of due care. On this latter view, the injurer’s 
moral responsibility for the injury rests directly on her failure to act 
as the average reasonable person would have acted. It does not prem-
ise the injurer’s responsibility on a claim that such a failure neces-
sarily constitutes morally culpable wrongdoing. 
Commentators adhering to the responsibility-based view have of-
fered different accounts of the particular sort of responsibility at issue 
and I cannot explore all the nuances of the different conceptions in 
this Article.195 However, most responsibility-based corrective justice 
theories of negligence liability share certain core features, two of 
which I will focus on here. 
First, accounts premising negligence liability on responsibility 
tend to center on an evaluation of the negligent action, considered in 
abstraction from the character, motives, attitudes, or mental state of 
the actor whose action it was.196 For example, in developing his no-
tion of outcome-responsibility, Stephen Perry notes 
[O]utcome-responsibility involves the retrospective evaluation of 
action in light of its outcome. Such evaluation can be moral but 
need not involve the ascription of blame or culpability. It is pos-
  
adversely affected someone else’s person or property” rather than on the “moral blameworthiness or 
merit of the defendant’s . . . conduct”); Larry Alexander, Negligence, Crime, and Tort: Comments on 
Hurd and Simons, 76 B.U. L. REV. 301, 302 (1996) (stating belief that inadvertent negligence is not 
culpable). 
 195. See, e.g., ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 94–113 (1999); Perry, 
Responsibility, supra note 25, at 73; Perry, Moral Foundations, supra note 25, at 496–512 (advocating 
avoidability-based conception of Tony Honore’s concept of outcome-responsibility); Joseph Raz, Re-
sponsibility and the Negligence Standard, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2010) (developing account 
of responsibility based on rational functioning, i.e., that one is responsible for conduct resulting from the 
functioning, successful or failed, of one’s capacity for rational agency); Ripstein, supra note 30, at 361 
(advocating a notion of responsibility based on reciprocity and risk ownership); Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Two Dimensions of Responsibility in Crime, Tort, and Moral Luck, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 97, 
110 (2008) (discussing the conception of responsibility implicit in civil recourse theory). 
 196. Perry, Moral Foundations, supra note 25, at 509. 
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sible to judge actions as actions, considered simply as the prod-
uct of agency, without judging the agent herself, although as the 
author of the action the agent’s reasons for subsequent action 
may be affected; it is, after all, still her action.197 
Responsibility-based accounts of negligence liability share the core 
belief in the validity of something like Jules Coleman’s distinction 
between “fault-in-the-doing” and “fault-in-the-doer” as well as in the 
notion that tort liability may be appropriate even where only the for-
mer is present.198 It is clear how this feature of responsibility-based 
views can help to account for the objective character of negligence 
liability. Provided that I have a basic capacity for rational agency, 
such liability can be assessed solely on the basis of what I, in fact, did 
rather than on the basis of what my conduct signifies about my dispo-
sition toward other agents. 
Second, responsibility-based accounts typically premise negli-
gence liability on the nature of the actor’s relationship to the risk that 
materialized in injury to the plaintiff.199 Most central in this regard is 
the notion of risk ownership. Arthur Ripstein explicitly rests his ac-
count of negligence liability on this notion and then argues that a rec-
iprocity-based conception of responsibility is implicit in it.200 Rip-
stein describes risk ownership in the following way: 
  
 197. Id.; see also RIPSTEIN, supra note 195, at 133 (“Tort law’s negligence standard measures con-
duct, apart from any questions about the defendant’s thoughts. . . .”); Id. at 73 (“We can thus restate the 
question of [tort] liability with a question about whose bad luck an injury is. In answering that question, 
no inquiry into the agent’s will or character is necessary, only one into his or her deeds.”); Coleman, 
supra note 148, at 219 (“Fault liability in torts refers to fault in the doing, not in the doer. An agent is at 
fault in torts whether or not the fault in his conduct marks a shortcoming in him.”); Jules L. Coleman, 
Mistakes, Misunderstandings, and Misalignments, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 541, 548 (2012), available at 
http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1061.pdf (“It is a commonplace that negligence is behavior rather 
than a state of mind. This means that one’s negligence consists in a failure on a particular occasion to act 
as would a person who takes the interests of others appropriately into account. Negligence does not 
require a disposition to act in a particular way or to have or hold others in a particular regard—as un-
worthy or less equal or what have you.”); Arthur Ripstein, Closing the Gap, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
L. 61, 76 (2008) (“Many cases of negligence reflect badly on the defendant. . . . [B]ut the basis for 
liability is the dangerousness of [the negligent actor’s] conduct, not its defective moral character.”). 
 198. See Coleman, supra note 148, at 219. 
 199. Ripstein, supra note 30, at 361 (advocating a notion of responsibility based on reciprocity and 
risk ownership). 
 200. RIPSTEIN, supra note 195, at 53–54. 
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In assigning liability, the fault system determines whose problem 
a certain loss is. When a risk ripens into an injury, the injury be-
longs to whomever the risk in question belongs. Reasonable 
risks—those risks the imposition of which is compatible with 
appropriate regard for the interests of others—lie where they fall. 
Unreasonable risks belong to those who create them; as a result, 
the injuries that result from unreasonable risk imposition belong 
to the injurers. Since they are the injurer’s problem, the injurer 
must make them up. Hence, damages provide the remedy.201 
Thus, for Ripstein, negligent actors own the risks created by their 
negligence.202 Something like this notion of risk ownership is also 
implicit in Perry’s responsibility-based account of negligence liabil-
ity.203 For Perry, an agent’s outcome-responsibility204 for a particular 
harm represents a “plateau of responsibility that singles out the out-
come-responsible agent as a potential cost-bearer.”205 It is not, there-
fore, a sufficient condition of a moral obligation to compensate the 
injured party.206 For Perry, negligence liability is appropriate only 
where the risk resulting in injury was created jointly by the victim 
and the injurer as part of an accepted pattern of interaction (e.g., 
driver-pedestrian interactions).207 In such circumstances, an actor has 
a duty to repair an injury when his conduct creates a risk that exceeds 
the normal range of risks associated with the pattern of interaction 
(e.g., he drives recklessly).208 He also owes a duty to repair harm 
caused by a risk lying within the normal range of risks associated 
  
 201. Id.; see also Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective Justice in an Age of Mass 
Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 214, 223–24 (Gerald Postema ed., 2001) (“[L]iability 
can be thought of on the model of ownership for a particular risk: If I create a risk, it is my risk, and if it 
ripens into an injury, the costs that it imposes are costs that others are entitled to force me to bear.”). 
 202. RIPSTEIN, supra note 195, at 53–54. 
 203. Perry, Responsibility, supra note 25, at 73. 
 204. According to Perry, “an agent is outcome-responsible for a harmful outcome if and only if he 
causally contributed to it, possessed the capacity to foresee it, and the ability and opportunity to take 
steps, on the basis of what could have been foreseen, to avoid it.” Id. at 91. 
 205. Id. at 73–74. 
 206. Id. at 74. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 112. 
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with the pattern of interaction if, per the Hand formula, he fails to 
take a precaution the cost of which is less than the expected cost of 
the harm (e.g., he fails to double-check the crosswalk before turn-
ing).209 “The basic idea,” observes Perry, “is that while risks are, in a 
wide variety of circumstances, the product of joint action, individual 
actors will very often exercise some degree of control, and often a 
great deal, over the level of risk in particular circumstances.”210 The 
notion of an actor exercising control over the level of risk imposed in 
particular circumstances strikes me as very similar to the concept of 
risk ownership.211 When I exercise a sufficient amount of control 
over the level of risk present in certain circumstances, it is appropri-
ate to regard the risk actually imposed as mine.212 
  
 209. Perry, Responsibility, supra note 25, at 113. 
 210. Id. at 112. 
 211. See Postema, supra note 157, at 8 (noting that Perry’s notion of outcome-responsibility “is not 
tied directly to blame or a right to punish, but rather with ‘ownership’ of losses”); see also id. at 11. 
 212. Notwithstanding the important similarities between the responsibility-based accounts offered by 
Perry and Ripstein, there is an important difference. Perry’s notion of responsibility is moral, while 
Ripstein’s is political. Whereas Perry believes that my duty to repair a negligently-caused injury derives 
from my pre-political status as a moral agent, Ripstein maintains that the duty derives from my status as 
a party to the social contract, i.e., my membership in a society whose coercive institutions set and en-
force the fair terms of interaction among its members. Ripstein thinks Perry’s view cannot account for 
the fact that negligence liability is based on the objective foreseeability of the injury. On Ripstein’s 
view, if the basis for negligence liability is a moral responsibility resting on my agency, I should only be 
liable for injuries that I actually foresaw and not for reasonably foreseeable injuries that I failed to 
foresee. This is because, as Ripstein puts it, “A person’s agency is expressed in her actual exercise of 
her capacities. That she, or some other, hypothetical person might have exercised them differently does 
not change what of her was expressed in the deed.” RIPSTEIN, supra note 195, at 100. Ripstein con-
cludes, “[F]oresight is not required because it is a general condition of agency. Instead, it is implicit in 
the idea of fair terms of interaction.” Id. at 105. Thus, Ripstein would seem to be committed to the view 
that, when my negligence involves a failure to foresee an injury that a reasonable person would have 
foreseen, I have no pre-political moral obligation to compensate the injured party. In my opinion, this 
position is untenable. It is founded on an unduly restrictive notion of moral responsibility, one which 
appears to conflate moral responsibility with moral culpability. If I take my eyes off the road for five 
seconds while driving and consequently run over a pedestrian, it would seem absurd to claim that my 
failure to foresee the possibility of the resulting injury excuses me from moral responsibility for it, 
however much that failure may diminish my blameworthiness. The pedestrian’s moral entitlement to 
receive compensation from me cannot plausibly depend on whether, on that particular occasion, I hap-
pened to foresee what an ordinary reasonable person would have foreseen. Ripstein takes too narrow a 
view of interpersonal morality when he suggests that reciprocity—”the idea that one person may not 
unilaterally set the terms of his interactions with others”—is one native to political morality. Id. at 2. 
Thus, though I rely heavily on Ripstein’s notion of risk ownership throughout this Article, I part ways 
with Ripstein in believing that a risk owner is morally responsible for injuries resulting from risks he 
owns (i.e., from his negligent conduct). In this respect, the responsibility-based conception of corrective 
justice I endorse here represents a hybrid of the accounts offered by Ripstein and Perry. 
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It is not difficult to see how responsibility-based versions of the 
corrective justice rationale for negligence liability can justify liability 
in the paradigm case of voluntary rescue. Because responsibility-
based accounts premise negligence liability on a feature of the negli-
gent action itself rather than on any feature of the negligent actor’s 
deliberative attitude toward other agents,213 the beneficent nature of 
the volunteer rescuer’s undertaking does not represent a hurdle to 
liability. An actor’s responsibility for a harmful outcome depends on 
whether, to adopt Ripstein’s terminology, the actor owns the risk ma-
terializing in that harm.214 An actor’s ownership of a particular risk 
depends fundamentally on whether the actor’s conduct conforms to 
the objective standard of care applicable under the circumstances; the 
actor’s intention, attitude, capacities, or mental state need not enter 
into the calculus. Therefore, that a harmful outcome resulted from a 
risk an actor imposed in the course of a genuine, wholehearted, and 
good-faith attempt to assist an imperiled person does not, at least in 
any obvious way, bear on the actor’s ownership of the risk—however 
much it may bear on the actor’s attitude toward the agency and phys-
ical security of the imperiled person. If one believes, for example, 
that the motorist in Swenson owned the risk that materialized in inju-
ry to the snowmobiler—since a fatal traffic collision is a foreseeable 
risk of making a U-turn on a highway and double-checking the road 
is a low-cost precaution that foreseeably mitigates that risk—
negligence liability would be appropriate from a corrective justice 
standpoint.215 That the negligent actor in Swenson made the U-turn in 
the course of a good faith, voluntary, and gratuitous effort to deliver 
the snowmobiler from a pre-existing peril would not represent an 
obstacle to liability since it does not touch on the question of risk 
ownership.216 
  
 213. Perry, Responsibility, supra note 25, at 73. 
 214. RIPSTEIN, supra note 195, at 53. 
 215. See supra text accompanying notes 165–72. 
 216. Although, for the drafters of the Restatement, the gratuitous and voluntary nature of the care 
offered would, at least in certain circumstances, be a factor to be taken into account in determining 
whether the rescuer exercised reasonable care under the circumstances. See supra note 53 and accompa-
nying text. 
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Thus, of the two types of corrective justice rationales for negli-
gence liability discussed—those based on culpability and those based 
on responsibility—it seems that only responsibility-based accounts 
can support liability in the paradigm case of samarital negligence. 
But just because the responsibility-based account can explain why, 
from the standpoint of corrective justice, liability is the right result in 
samarital negligence cases does not mean that liability actually is the 
right result. In other words, why does my argument that culpability-
based rationales fail to support liability in a case like Swenson not 
show that, from a corrective justice perspective, liability is, in fact, 
not appropriate in such a case?217 Looking at such cases, do our intui-
tions tell us that, from the standpoint of justice, the rescuer should 
bear the loss—or at least some portion of it? To pose this question in 
a slightly different way, do two particular features of the paradigm 
voluntary rescue situation—the pre-existence of a risk to the imper-
iled person’s well-being for which the rescuer has no responsibility 
and the voluntary, gratuitous nature of the rescuer’s attempt to pre-
vent that pre-existing risk from materializing—make the rescuer’s 
failure to exercise reasonable care less of a compelling basis for shift-
ing the loss (or some portion of it) onto the rescuer than it would be 
in an ordinary case of non-samarital negligence? 
C. Samarital Negligence Through The Lens Of Risk Ownership 
The answer to this question will vary according to the particular 
circumstances of the rescue and the nature of the rescuer’s relation-
ship to the risk(s) that materialized in injury to the imperiled person. 
This returns us to the question discussed in Part I: whether, for pur-
poses of liability for samarital negligence, it should make a differ-
ence whether the rescuer’s negligence placed the imperiled person in 
a worse position than she would have been in had the rescuer re-
  
 217. Recall that in Swenson, the Good Samaritan immunity shielded the defendant from liability. The 
relevant question is not, then, whether liability was correctly imposed but whether, from a corrective 
justice standpoint, liability would have been appropriate assuming it were established that the rescuer’s 
failure to exercise reasonable care resulted in injury. 
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frained from offering assistance.218 I now return to the question of 
position-worsening, looking at it through the lens of risk ownership. 
Before applying the concept of risk ownership to cases of samarital 
negligence, it will be helpful to distinguish two senses in which neg-
ligent conduct can involve risk. This distinction is not, to my 
knowledge, discussed by Ripstein, Perry, or any other corrective jus-
tice theorist, probably because it becomes relevant only in specific 
circumstances, most notably, where the actor’s duty of care is based 
on a voluntary undertaking. The distinction can be stated roughly as 
follows: acting in the world very often creates foreseeable risk to 
others; acting in the world without exercising reasonable care creates 
further foreseeable risk. I label the first “action risk” and the second 
“breach risk.” An example will help to illustrate the distinction. The 
act of driving my car at a normal driving speed down a busy street, 
no matter how carefully I might do so, creates a foreseeable risk of 
harm to pedestrians and other drivers. By putting my car in motion at 
normal driving speed in the vicinity of other people, I create (or par-
ticipate in creating) the possibility of others being injured in a way 
that would not be possible if I stayed at home, namely, I create the 
possibility of others being injured through a collision with my car. 
Now, suppose that, while I drive down the busy street, I begin texting 
furiously on my iPhone. One might say that, in doing so, I have failed 
to exercise reasonable care with respect to the risk I have created by 
driving down the street. One might also observe that, through that 
failure, I have increased the risk presented by my driving down the 
busy street; indeed, I have transformed the risk of driving down the 
street while keeping my attention on the road into the greater risk of 
driving down the street while dividing my visual attention between 
the road and my iPhone. The crucial point is that, as the Restatement 
(Third) puts it, “[N]egligent conduct always increases risk beyond 
that which would exist without the negligent conduct.”219 
  
 218. See supra Part I. 
 219. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 44 re-
porters’ note, cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
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Risk ownership in ordinary cases of negligence (i.e., those not in-
volving voluntary undertakings) typically rests on the presence of 
both action risk and breach risk. In other words, underlying the sense 
that the defendant owns the injury-causing risk is the belief that the 
injury the plaintiff suffers lies foreseeably within both the risk that 
the defendant creates just by acting in the world in a particular way 
and the further risk the defendant creates by failing to moderate the 
risks created by his action through the exercise of reasonable care. 
This is just another way of saying that ordinary cases of negligence 
involve a defendant who creates a risk of harm and then fails to exer-
cise reasonable care with respect to that risk.220 
The Restatement (Third) takes the position that the fundamental 
duty associated with negligence law is to exercise reasonable care 
when creating a risk of harm.221 The sense of “risk” at work here is 
action risk. According to the Restatement, the affirmative duties, of 
which the volunteer rescuer doctrine is one, concern the duties bind-
ing actors in situations where the plaintiff is injured as the result of a 
risk the actor did not create out of whole cloth.222 Thus, a case like 
Swenson—where the risks materializing in injury to the imperiled 
person are created entirely by the rescuer—is not, according to the 
Restatement, properly analyzed under the volunteer rescuer doc-
trine.223 In such cases, the pre-existing peril necessitating the rescu-
er’s intervention did not proximately cause the plaintiff’s injuries 
since those injuries resulted not from the risk posed by the pre-
existing peril but from the action risk posed by the rescuer’s interven-
tion (e.g., making a U-turn on a highway). The key distinguishing 
mark of such cases is that the harm the imperiled person suffers is 
  
 220. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 
(2010) (stating the duty not to act negligently is a “duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s 
conduct creates a risk of physical harm”). The Restatement specifically notes that the volunteer rescuer 
doctrine and other duties attaching upon voluntary undertakings are affirmative duties “imposed even 
though the actor did not create a risk of harm to another.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY 
FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 3, scope note (2010). 
 221. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 6 
(2010). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794, 795 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
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within the foreseeable action risk presented by the rescuer’s conduct, 
even when that risk is considered in isolation from the peril necessi-
tating the rescuer’s intervention. A serious collision is a foreseeable 
risk of making a U-turn on a highway regardless of whether the driv-
er, in making the turn, is acting to alleviate a pre-existing peril facing 
her passenger. 
Where an imperiled person is injured through an action and breach 
risk created entirely by her rescuer, the sense of the injurer’s owner-
ship of the harmful outcome would, in at least one sense, seem to be 
no weaker than in an ordinary case of non-samarital negligence. In 
Swenson, the risks materializing in injury to the imperiled person 
(making a U-turn on a highway without appropriately checking the 
road for oncoming traffic) were created entirely by her rescuer. In 
other words, the action and breach risks posed by the rescuer’s con-
duct are exhaustive of the risks materializing in harm to the imperiled 
person. In this particular respect, a case like Swenson224 is identical to 
an ordinary case of non-samarital negligence. One can say with near 
certainty not only that, absent the rescuer’s failure to exercise due 
care, the imperiled person would not have suffered the particular in-
jury that she suffered, but also that, had the rescuer chosen not to of-
fer assistance at all, the imperiled person would not have suffered 
such injury. In such a case, where the rescuer owns the entirety of the 
harm-causing risk, the sense is strongest that the rescuer’s failure to 
exercise reasonable care with regard to that risk, and her consequent 
responsibility for the harm caused, should give rise to a moral duty of 
repair. In light of the rescuer’s total ownership of the harm-causing 
risk, it is appropriate to shift the resulting loss from the imperiled 
person to the rescuer. I think this makes sense intuitively. It would be 
difficult, I think, to deny the snowmobiler’s parents’ moral entitle-
ment to a quantum of compensation from the rescuer (or her insur-
ance company) to cover, for example, medical and funereal expenses 
incurred as a result of the accident. 
  
 224. Id. 
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But why, one might ask, does it not make a difference that the res-
cuer imposed this risk as part of a good faith, voluntary effort to as-
sist another person in an emergency? The rescuer’s conduct may 
have created an independent risk of harm, but the rescuer created that 
risk for the sole purpose of providing a much-needed benefit to the 
imperiled person, a benefit the rescuer was under no legal or profes-
sional duty to provide. Arguably, this makes a case like Swenson im-
portantly different from an ordinary case of non-samarital negli-
gence, notwithstanding the similarity discussed in the preceding par-
agraph. 
The question, though, is whether this difference negates the imper-
iled person’s moral entitlement to compensation. As I said a moment 
ago, as an intuitive matter, I do not believe it does. Few of us, I think, 
believe that a greater injustice would be done to the rescuer by asking 
her to shoulder at least some portion225 of the snowmobiler’s loss 
than would be done to the snowmobiler’s family by denying them 
any compensation for that loss from the rescuer. If the choice is be-
tween saying to the snowmobiler’s family, “The law denies you any 
compensation from the defendant who was responsible for creating 
the risks that materialized in fatal injury to your loved one because 
the defendant created those risks as part of a gratuitous attempt to 
rescue your loved one from a pre-existing peril,” and saying to the 
rescuer, “The law requires you to pay some compensation to the 
snowmobiler’s family because, though you imposed risks as part of a 
voluntary, good-faith rescue attempt, the risks materializing in the 
snowmobiler’s death were ones created by your actions and breach of 
due care in conducting the rescue,” most of us would, I imagine, be-
lieve justice lies with the latter. One might, of course, believe that the 
  
 225. Here, I suggest that it may be appropriate for the rescuer to bear only a portion of the imperiled 
person’s loss rather than the entirety of it. In this Article, I ask whether corrective justice considerations 
provide a basis for imposing any degree of liability on the volunteer rescuer for her negligence. I leave 
for another day the question whether, given the beneficent, voluntary nature of the rescuer’s interven-
tion, corrective justice considerations provide a basis for making the rescuer’s liability for the imperiled 
person’s injury less than total. Cf. ALAN CALNAN, JUSTICE AND TORT LAW 104 (1997) (advocating 
partial liability in cases where, “[g]iven the gulf between the culpability of [the defendant’s] act and the 
seriousness of [the plaintiff’s] injury, it seems unfair to hold either party wholly accountable for the 
loss”). 
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former response is appropriate on the basis of instrumental consid-
erations, i.e., encouraging people to volunteer their aid in emergency 
situations. But, as discussed above, my analysis here is concerned 
with determining whether nonliability in such situations can be justi-
fied on non-instrumental, fairness grounds. My position is that it can-
not because, from the standpoint of corrective justice, negligence 
liability is premised on risk ownership and, in a case like Swenson, 
the rescuer is properly regarded as the owner of the risk that material-
ized in harm, notwithstanding the beneficent, voluntary nature of her 
intervention. 
Does the situation change when the rescuer has merely increased 
the already-existing risk rather than creating an independent risk of 
harm? Increasing the already-existing risk of harm means elevating 
the risk of harm “beyond that which existed in the absence of the ac-
tor’s undertaking”226 and often involves some significant change in 
the imperiled person’s physical circumstances, such as moving the 
imperiled person to a different location.227 Consider a case like Jack-
son v. Mercy Health Center, Inc.228 In Jackson, Tim Jackson accom-
panied his pregnant wife into an operating room at the defendant 
hospital to observe her Caesarean section.229 During the preparations 
for the surgery, Jackson became dizzy.230 Hospital personnel took his 
arm, led him out of the operating room into the hallway, and seated 
  
 226. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 42 cmt. f 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). At least two courts have stated that, when the defendant rescuer is 
alleged to have worsened the plaintiff’s position by increasing the risk of harm, the relevant “test is not 
whether the risk was increased over what it would have been if the defendant had not been negligent, 
but rather whether the risk was increased over what it would have been had the defendant not engaged in 
the undertaking at all.” Sagan v. United States, 342 F.3d 493, 498 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Myers v. 
United States, 17 F.3d 890, 903 (6th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 44 reporters’ 
note, cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“negligent conduct always increases risk beyond that 
which would exist without the negligent conduct”). 
 227. Cf. Patentas v. United States, 687 F.2d 707, 717 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that, for the purposes of 
section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an increased risk of harm involves “some physical 
change to the environment or some other material alteration of circumstances”). 
 228. Jackson v. Mercy Health Ctr., Inc., 864 P.2d 839 (Okla. 1993). 
 229. Id. at 841. 
 230. Id. 
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him on his wife’s empty hospital bed.231 The hospital personnel did 
not raise the bed’s side rails or otherwise secure Jackson to the 
bed.232 Jackson then fell and injured himself.233 The court held the 
hospital immune from liability under Oklahoma’s Good Samaritan 
immunity statute.234 In such a case, does it seem less appropriate, 
from the standpoint of corrective justice, to shift the loss from the 
imperiled person to the rescuer? Note that the risk materializing in 
injury to the imperiled person is a composite of the pre-existing peril 
necessitating the rescuer’s intervention and the action risk created by 
the rescuer’s conduct in performing the rescue. The harm the imper-
iled person suffers is within this composite risk, though it is typically 
not within the rescuer’s action risk considered on its own. Placing a 
healthy, stable person on a gurney might not pose a foreseeable risk 
of the person rolling off the gurney onto the floor but placing a dizzy 
person on a gurney certainly might. At the very least, placing a dizzy 
person on a gurney poses a greater foreseeable risk of a fall than 
placing a healthy person on a gurney. Does the fact that the imperiled 
person’s injury does not lie within the rescuer’s action risk, consid-
ered on its own, dilute the sense that it is appropriate to shift the im-
periled person’s loss, or a significant portion of it, to the rescuer? 
I do not believe it does. In such cases, the action risk posed by the 
rescuer’s non-breach-constituting conduct is part of the composite of 
risks that materializes in injury to the imperiled person. The breach 
risk is, of course, part of this composite too. Whatever foreseeable 
risk of a fall is created by placing a dizzy person on a gurney, an ad-
ditional risk is created by failing to raise the gurney’s side rails. But 
the key point for purposes of risk ownership is that the harm the im-
periled person suffers, in addition to falling within the actor’s breach 
risk, falls within the risk posed by certain actions of the rescuer other 
  
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 841, 845 n.24. An expert witness for the plaintiff testified that the failure to place the side 
rails up on the bed constituted a departure from the “standards of hospitals in Oklahoma.” Id. at 845 
n.24. For the purposes of deciding the case, the court assumed that the failure to secure Jackson to the 
bed “may have” constituted negligence. Id. at 842. 
 233. Id. at 841. 
 234. Jackson, 864 P.2d at 844–45. 
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than those constituting the breach. That is, the rescuer’s breach con-
sists not just in a failure to appropriately mitigate risks posed by the 
pre-existing peril; it also involves a failure to mitigate risks she her-
self created (or enhanced) in conducting the rescue. 
For this reason, the rescuer can properly be regarded as the owner 
of the risk that materialized in harm to the imperiled person. In a case 
like Jackson, where a volunteer rescuer has significantly increased 
the already-existing risk of harm,235 the rescuer may not have been 
responsible for creating the totality of the harm-causing risk, but she 
nevertheless played a crucial role in making that risk what it was. In 
other words, cases involving an increase in the risk of harm often 
involve not only a quantitative elevation in the chances of the pre-
existing risk materializing in injury, but also a qualitative change in 
the precise nature of the risk. 
In placing the dizzy hospital visitor on a gurney without raising the 
side rails, the hospital personnel in Jackson converted the risk of a 
dizzy person collapsing from a chair or a standing position into the 
more serious risk of such a person falling to the floor from an elevat-
ed platform.236 In moving the sick patron to the infirmary and aban-
doning her, the store personnel in Zelenko converted the modest risk 
associated with a person’s taking ill in a public place into the far 
more serious risk of a person’s remaining ill for a prolonged period in 
an isolated place without any sort of medical attention or treat-
ment.237 In these cases, there is therefore sufficient ownership of the 
harm-causing risk to make the rescuer’s failure to exercise due care 
with regard to that risk sufficient grounds on which to impose a duty 
of repair for at least some portion of the resulting loss. 
The situation is somewhat different where the rescuer increases the 
risk of harm by deterring or precluding others from intervening rather 
than by effecting some material change in the imperiled person’s 
physical circumstances.238 For example, in United States v. Gavagan, 
  
 235. Id. at 841. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 287 N.Y.S. 134, 135 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1935). 
 238. According to the Third Restatement, inducing reliance by third parties is simply one way a 
 
61
Waisman: Negligence, Responsibility, and the Clumsy Samaritan: Is there a
Published by Reading Room, 2013
670 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:3 
the Coast Guard undertook to rescue a disabled shrimping boat.239 
Though crewmembers of the disabled boat had close friends on other 
boats in the vicinity who were aware of the situation, in close com-
munication with the Coast Guard, and prepared to assist, they stood 
by in “continued reliance upon the Coast Guard’s celebrated skill.”240 
Due to an internal communication error, Coast Guard vessels failed 
to reach the disabled boat before darkness fell and its crew was 
lost.241 Applying the volunteer rescuer doctrine, the court held the 
Coast Guard liable for the deaths of the crewmembers.242 In such a 
case, the rescuer has an important role in making the risk of harm 
what it is since her intervention transforms the risk from one poten-
tially mitigable by multiple parties into one mitigable by only a sin-
gle party. The risk that materializes in injury to the imperiled person 
therefore encompasses not only the rescuer’s breach risk, but also her 
action risk, in the sense that the non-breach-constituting action of 
discouraging others from intervening heightens the risk of harm to 
the imperiled person. The transformation of the risk in such a case 
seems more quantitative than qualitative, i.e., the rescuer does not 
change the nature of the risk but makes the chances of the risk mate-
rializing greater by restricting the field of potential rescuers. Still, in 
a case like Gavagan,243 depriving the imperiled person of the possi-
bility of assistance from other sources decreases the imperiled per-
son’s chances of being brought to safety to such a degree as to make 
the situation similar to one in which the rescuer has increased the risk 
through a change in physical circumstances. It is appropriate, there-
  
volunteer rescuer can increase the risk of harm to the imperiled person. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 42 cmt. f (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 
2005) (“This requirement [that the actor have increased the risk] is often met because the plaintiff or 
another relied on the actor’s performing the undertaking in a nonnegligent manner and declined to 
pursue an alternative means for protection. Although reliance is merely a specific manner of increasing 
the risk of harm to another, this Section retains reliance as a separate basis for imposing a duty because 
historically it has been treated separately.”). 
 239. United States v. Gavagan, 280 F.2d 319, 323–24 (5th Cir. 1960). 
 240. Id. at 328–29. 
 241. Id. at 324–25. 
 242. Id. at 330. 
 243. Id. at 325. 
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fore, to regard the rescuer as the owner of the risk and to shift at least 
some portion of the imperiled person’s loss onto her shoulders. 
In this section, I have argued that, from the standpoint of correc-
tive justice, liability is appropriate under the volunteer rescuer doc-
trine in cases like Swenson, Jackson, and Gavagan.244 Though one 
might reasonably balk at the idea of shifting the entirety of the imper-
iled person’s loss onto the volunteer rescuer’s shoulders in such cas-
es, most of us, I think, intuitively believe it would be fair to ask the 
rescuer to bear some portion of the loss. I have invoked the concept 
of risk ownership to explain this intuition. Where the risks materializ-
ing in injury to the imperiled person encompass both a risk posed by 
the manner in which the rescuer chose to conduct the rescue (action 
risk) and a risk posed by her failure to exercise reasonable care in 
conducting it (breach risk), it is appropriate to regard the risk as be-
longing to the actor rather than to the imperiled person. In such cases, 
the rescuer has not merely negligently failed to mitigate the pre-
existing risk to the imperiled person; she has negligently failed to 
mitigate risks that she herself had a hand in creating. My core point is 
that the concept of risk ownership does a good job of accounting for 
our intuitions concerning how, from the standpoint of corrective jus-
tice, the imperiled person’s loss should be allocated in such cases. 
D. Non-Worsening Samarital Negligence Revisited 
But what about cases in which the volunteer rescuer has not in-
creased the risk of harm beyond that presented by the pre-existing 
peril, where the imperiled person has not, as a result of the interven-
tion, been placed in a worse position than she would have been had 
the rescuer refrained from intervening? In cases where the rescuer 
has not worsened the imperiled person’s position, one definitively 
cannot assert that, had the rescuer chosen not to offer assistance at 
all, the imperiled person would not have suffered the injury she suf-
fered. In such cases, the injury the imperiled person suffers is pre-
  
 244. See Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983); Gavagan, 280 F.2d at 321; 
Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794, 800 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
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cisely the injury she would have suffered had the rescuer not under-
taken to assist at all. That, in fact, would have to be the very basis of 
liability. For this reason, there is undeniably an intuitive reluctance to 
shift the imperiled person’s loss onto the rescuer. The intuition that it 
is unfair to impose negligence liability on the volunteer rescuer is 
probably strongest where it seems the rescuer is being held responsi-
ble for harm resulting from a risk that existed prior to her arrival on 
the scene and for whose creation she had no responsibility. In cases 
like Swenson and Jackson,245 the rescuer has a significant degree of 
ownership of the risk that materializes in the imperiled person’s inju-
ry since she either creates that risk in the course of the rescue or acts 
in a way that intensifies and, in some sense, reshapes the pre-existing 
risk. In such cases, the rescuer is being held morally responsible for 
the harmful effects of a risk she had a hand in creating. But in cases 
of non-worsening samarital negligence, the risk materializing in harm 
to the imperiled person is one the rescuer has not created, intensified, 
or reshaped; it is one she has merely failed to mitigate. 
All of the Restatement’s examples of non-worsening negligence 
involve acts so callous and inexplicable as to suggest bad faith or 
recklessness.246 Prime examples include the stop-at-the-tavern,247 the 
rescuer who pulls a drowning man halfway to safety and then aban-
dons the effort for no apparent reason,248 and the rescuer who saves 
the drowning victim only to leave him in the middle of a busy high-
way.249 But consider the following variation on the stop-at-the-tavern 
hypothetical, one that I intend to represent an act of ordinary negli-
gence committed in good faith. 
  
 245. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d at 1202; Swenson, 653 N.W.2d at 795–96. 
 246. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 44 
cmt. e, h (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 323 cmt. e, 324 
cmt. g (1965). 
 247. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 248. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 44 
cmt. h (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 cmt. e (1965). 
 249. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 44 
cmt. h (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 cmt. g 
(1965). 
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A driver sees a badly bleeding pedestrian lying on the side of a 
remote, rural highway in the middle of the night. The driver picks up 
the pedestrian and begins to drive him to the nearest hospital, some 
fifty miles away. Twenty miles into the trip, the driver passes a gas 
station but, caught up in the urgency of the situation, keeps his eyes 
on the road and fails to check his gas gauge. Had he done so, he 
would have noticed that his gas tank was nearly empty. Ten miles 
after passing the gas station, the driver runs out of gas. As a conse-
quence, it is several hours before the driver manages to arrive with 
the pedestrian at the hospital, by which time the pedestrian has lost so 
much blood that he cannot be saved. 
Assume that, had the driver stopped for gas and then driven 
straight to the hospital, the pedestrian could have been saved. As-
sume further that the driver’s failure to stop for gas constituted a fail-
ure to use reasonable care under the circumstances. Should the driver 
nevertheless be permitted to avoid liability upon a showing that, prior 
to noon the following day, no other driver or pedestrian passed the 
point at which the injured pedestrian was lying and that therefore, 
had the driver not stopped, the pedestrian would have bled to death 
on the side of the highway? 
I suspect that different people may respond differently to this ques-
tion. But I think that very fact shows that the question of whether 
non-position-worsening negligence should be actionable under the 
volunteer rescuer doctrine is a more complicated one than the Re-
statement suggests. The Restatement stacks the deck against the posi-
tion-worsening requirement by offering examples of such severe 
misconduct that one hesitates to excuse it on any basis.250 As I hope 
the empty-gas-tank example shows, the picture gets somewhat fuzzi-
er when dealing with a case of ordinary negligence committed in 
good faith by a lay rescuer.251 
  
 250. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 44 
cmt. e, h (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 323 cmt. e, 324 
cmt. g (1965). 
 251. I doubt that a factual causation analysis can explain the differing intuitions I suspect many peo-
ple would have regarding the propriety of liability in the stop-at-the-tavern and empty-gas-tank exam-
ples. If one believes liability would be appropriate in the stop-at-the-tavern, one presumably believes 
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The question is whether the rescuer can, in any meaningful sense, 
be said to own the harm-causing risk in cases of this type where the 
rescuer does not, as a result of her intervention, place the imperiled 
person in any worse position than she would have been in had the 
rescuer chosen not to intervene. In other words, where the imperiled 
person’s injuries lie only within the rescuer’s breach risk, and not 
within her action risk, under what circumstances, if any, can the res-
cuer be said to own the risk that materialized in harm? In the stop-at-
the-tavern and empty-gas-tank examples, the only actions of the res-
cuer that pose a risk within which the imperiled person’s injuries 
happened to fall are those that constitute breach of the applicable 
standard of care. To be sure, the rescuer’s non-breaching actions—
placing the bleeding pedestrian in her car, driving the pedestrian to 
the hospital—created risks of harm, but those risks did not material-
ize in injury to the pedestrian. The only rescuer-derived risk that 
could be said to have resulted in injury to the pedestrian was that 
posed by the rescuer’s negligent conduct, i.e., stopping at the tavern 
or failing to stop for gas. 
Breach risk is typically second-order risk; it is risk that consists in 
the actor’s failure to mitigate some other risk. In ordinary negligence 
cases, the risk the actor, through her breach, fails to mitigate is her 
own action risk, i.e., a risk the actor has herself created by acting in 
the world. Keeping an attentive eye on the road is a way of mitigating 
the risk I create to others by driving down a busy street. What makes 
  
that the rescuer’s negligent conduct factually caused the plaintiff’s injury, notwithstanding that had the 
rescuer chosen not to intervene, the pedestrian would have suffered precisely the same injury. If one 
believes that, it seems to me one is committed to a similar view about the empty-gas-tank example. The 
relevant counterfactual inquiry in determining factual causation is “what would have occurred if the 
actor had not engaged in the tortious conduct.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmt. e (2010). In both the stop-at-the tavern and empty-gas-tank 
examples, the fact that, absent the rescuer’s intervention, the victim would have suffered the same 
ultimate fate (death) does not negate factual causation because one can still say with near certainty that, 
but for the rescuer’s tortious conduct (i.e. his recklessness in stopping at the tavern or negligence in 
failing to check his gas gauge as he passed the gas station), the victim would have survived. Factual 
causation is present because, had the rescuer not acted tortiously, the harm would have been avoided. Of 
course, the very concept of tortious action presupposes the existence of a duty of care. The fact that, had 
the defendant not acted at all, the plaintiff would have suffered the same harm may still be relevant to 
liability, but it seems to me it is relevant to the existence of a duty, not to causation. 
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samarital negligence cases of the non-worsening type somewhat unu-
sual is that the actor’s breach consists in a failure to mitigate a risk 
for whose creation she has no responsibility. The rescuer’s negli-
gence consists solely in failing to appropriately mitigate the pre-
existing, foreign risk necessitating her intervention, not in failing to 
mitigate her own action risk. 
It is important to keep in mind that, as a general matter, the law 
does not hesitate to impose liability for negligence that results in a 
failure to mitigate a pre-existing, foreign risk rather than a failure to 
protect against a risk the defendant herself had a hand in creating. For 
example, the law imposes negligence liability on the physician who 
negligently fails to interrupt a pre-existing condition from taking its 
harmful course252 and on the rescuer with a pre-existing duty of care 
to the imperiled person for negligently failing to alleviate the peril.253 
But the case of non-worsening samarital negligence seems important-
ly different because of the voluntary, altruistic nature of the rescuer’s 
intervention. 
When a volunteer rescuer’s intervention creates or increases the 
risk that ends up harming the imperiled person, the rescuer could, by 
hypothesis, have prevented the harm both by using due care and by 
choosing not to intervene. This is just another way of saying that the 
harm befalling the imperiled person lies within both the rescuer’s 
action risk (considered on its own or in conjunction with the risk 
posed by the pre-existing peril) and her breach risk. In such a case, 
the ultimate result of the intervention was to cause a harm that quite 
likely could have been avoided had the rescuer gone on his cheerful 
way. There is a retrospective sense, then, in which the imperiled per-
son’s complaint with the rescuer’s conduct can legitimately begin 
  
 252. See 1 Med. Malpractice, supra note 43, § 4.02 nn.10, 12 & 13 (Dec. 2007) (citing examples of 
cases in which courts imposed malpractice liability for negligent omissions such as failure to hospital-
ize, failure to inform patient of diagnosis or need for treatment, failure to prescribe necessary medica-
tion, and failure to correctly diagnose patient’s condition). 
 253. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 40 cmt. f, illus. 1, 3, cmt. j, illus. 4 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (providing examples of situa-
tions in which a rescuer with a special relationship to the imperiled person would be subject to negli-
gence liability for failing to ameliorate, as opposed to worsening, the imperiled person’s condition). 
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with the undertaking itself. By this I mean that, in retrospect, the im-
periled person (or his survivors) in cases like Swenson, Jackson, and 
Gavagan254 might reasonably say to the rescuer: all things consid-
ered, it would have been better if you had never gotten involved. By 
contrast, in cases where the rescuer merely fails, albeit negligently, to 
ameliorate the imperiled person’s condition, the undertaking itself is 
not, retrospectively, the point at which the victim can take issue with 
the rescuer’s conduct. 
The failure to use due care in the course of the rescue, not the vol-
untary undertaking itself, represents the sole basis on which the im-
periled person can reasonably take issue with the rescuer’s conduct. 
And, crucially, the imperiled person’s claim against the rescuer for 
negligently failing to ameliorate her condition is premised, causally 
and logically, on the rescuer’s beneficent act of undertaking to offer 
aid. Had there been no such act, there would have been no occasion 
to sue the rescuer. Though the same might be said in cases where the 
rescuer’s intervention leaves the imperiled person worse off, the im-
periled person can respond that, in retrospect, the rescuer’s wrongdo-
ing began with that same act, i.e., the action risk the rescuer created 
in performing the rescue, as well as her breach risk, materialized in 
the imperiled person’s injury. 
There is therefore a sense, in cases of non-worsening samarital 
negligence, in which the imperiled person attempts to use the rescu-
er’s own beneficent act against her. This, in my view, is the source 
not only of the strong intuitive repulsion against penalizing the Sa-
maritan in such cases but also of a legitimate moral reason for letting 
the imperiled person’s loss lie where it has fallen rather than shifting 
the loss (or any portion of it) onto the rescuer. If the law frowns on 
the notion of a person profiting under it as a result of their own 
wrong,255 it should, by the same token, abhor the notion of a person 
suffering under the law as a result of their own beneficence In cases 
  
 254. See Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Gavagan, 280 F.2d 
319 (5th Cir. 1960); Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
 255. This maxim has been described as lying “deep down among the foundations of English jurispru-
dence.” Wellner v. Eckstein, 117 N.W. 830, 838 (Minn. 1908) (Elliott, J., dissenting). 
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where a lay rescuer has committed an act of ordinary negligence that 
does not increase the risk of harm beyond that present when the res-
cuer intervened, this principle tells us that the rescuer’s ownership of 
the breach risk does not provide a sufficient basis in corrective justice 
for shifting the loss onto the rescuer. There is something perverse 
about premising the actor’s liability for a harmful outcome on her act 
of voluntarily undertaking to offer assistance to another in peril 
where the altruistic nature of the undertaking is untainted by any ret-
rospective sense that the undertaking itself created or increased the 
risk that materialized in harm. 
Where the gravamen of a samarital negligence action is the volun-
teer rescuer’s responsibility for the same harm that would have re-
sulted absent the rescuer’s intervention, it seems to me that, in addi-
tion to the action-centered considerations native to responsibility-
based views of negligence liability, agent-centered considerations—
such as the agent’s deliberative attitude toward the security and well-
being of other agents—may become relevant to the question of risk 
ownership in a way they are not elsewhere. This does not represent a 
concession to an agent-centered, culpability-based account of negli-
gence liability, for such accounts posit that negligence liability is 
necessarily founded on an attitudinal defect in the agent. The case of 
samarital negligence represents a challenge to those views because it 
shows that negligence liability may be appropriate even where the 
injurer’s general course of conduct indicates an appropriately impar-
tial and respectful attitude toward other agents. That the character of 
the agent’s deliberative attitude toward other agents need not be rele-
vant to negligence liability, however, does not mean that, in appro-
priate circumstances, it cannot be. My point is merely that in cases 
like the empty-gas-tank example—where a lay rescuer, without in-
creasing the risk of harm or otherwise worsening the imperiled per-
son’s position, negligently fails to prevent the pre-existing risk from 
materializing—the altruistic nature of the rescuer’s undertaking can 
render the rescuer’s failure to exercise reasonable care an insufficient 
basis for shifting the imperiled person’s loss onto her shoulders. Put 
slightly differently, in such circumstances, the rescuer’s breach risk is 
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not a sufficient basis for attributing ownership of the risk that materi-
alized in harm. 
In certain circumstances, however, the rescuer should properly be 
regarded as the owner of the risk that materialized in harm notwith-
standing the fact that the only risk she posed was that created by her 
breach. Once a volunteer rescuer takes charge of a helpless and im-
periled person, she exerts a uniquely high degree of control over that 
person’s fate and well-being. It is not an exaggeration to say that, in 
such cases, the rescuer, upon taking charge, often holds the imperiled 
person’s life in his or her hands. And, importantly, this holds true 
whether or not the rescuer’s act of taking charge discourages inter-
vention by others. Moreover, the imperiled person, as a result of the 
often extreme nature of the peril he is facing and his helplessness to 
extricate himself from it, typically has no choice but to rely on the 
assistance of the particular person who has volunteered. The imper-
iled person may even be “unconscious or otherwise incapable of de-
ciding whether to accept or to reject the assistance.”256 I would sug-
gest that it is in light of these circumstances—the extraordinary de-
gree of control the rescuer exerts over the imperiled person’s well-
being upon taking charge and the rescuer’s essentially unilateral de-
cision over whether such control gets placed in his own hands—that 
the Restatement maintains that the rescuer should be held accounta-
ble for the consequences of any deviation from a reasonable standard 
of conduct while the imperiled person is within his charge, even a 
deviation that leaves the imperiled person no worse off than he would 
have been had the rescuer chosen not to intervene.257 Although I 
think the Restatement goes too far in suggesting that liability may be 
appropriate in cases like the empty-gas-tank example, I do believe 
that, in two types of cases, the radical susceptibility of the imperiled 
person to the rescuer’s carelessness may support liability even where 
the imperiled person’s position has not been worsened as a result. 
  
 256. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 cmt. b (1965). 
 257. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 44 cmt. e 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
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The first type of case is where the rescuer’s misconduct involves 
bad faith or goes beyond ordinary negligence. In the stop-at-the-
tavern example, once the rescuer has taken charge by placing the pe-
destrian in his car, the pedestrian becomes radically susceptible to 
being harmed or benefitted by the rescuer’s conduct. Given the ex-
treme nature of the peril and the pedestrian’s helplessness in the face 
of it, whether the pedestrian lives or dies depends directly on what 
the rescuer does after taking charge. In choosing to stop at a tavern 
while the badly injured pedestrian lies helpless and bleeding in his 
vehicle, the rescuer has, in an extreme way, abused the extraordinary 
power he has chosen to assume over the pedestrian’s welfare. The 
Restatement’s position, which I think is defensible, is that such egre-
gious abuse should be actionable258 notwithstanding the fact that the 
pedestrian would have been no better off had the rescuer chosen not 
to intervene. In such a case, using the rescuer’s beneficent act of un-
dertaking the rescue as a premise for negligence liability is not trou-
bling from a moral point of view because the rescuer’s subsequent 
conduct, in a clear sense, negates the beneficence of the undertaking. 
The rescuer’s breach is, in other words, so extreme that, even though 
her only contribution to the risk materializing in harm was the breach 
itself, it still seems appropriate to regard her as the owner of that risk. 
The second type of case is where the volunteer rescuer is a physi-
cian or other professional bound by an ethical duty to provide volun-
tary assistance in an emergency. For example, in Matts v. Homsi, 
Ronald Matts came to a hospital emergency room with abdominal 
bleeding after being involved in a car accident.259 Realizing that 
Matts needed surgery, the staff physician at the emergency room 
called R.K. Homsi, another staff physician at the hospital, who was 
not on call at the time and who “had no direct responsibility to re-
spond to the request for assistance if he did not want to.”260 When 
Homsi arrived at the emergency room, he found Matts bleeding pro-
  
 258. Id. at cmt. e, h; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 323 cmt. e, 324 cmt. g (1965). 
 259. Matts v. Homsi, 308 N.W.2d 284, 285 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (per curiam). 
 260. Id. 
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fusely and in severe shock.261 Homsi performed several hours of sur-
gery and Matts’s condition started to improve.262 The next day, how-
ever, Matts’s condition deteriorated.263 His kidneys failed and his 
lungs became congested.264 A second surgery revealed several unre-
paired tears to his mesentery tissues and several unrepaired holes in 
his small intestine.265 Soon after the second surgery, Matts died.266 
The court held Homsi immune from liability under Michigan’s Good 
Samaritan immunity statute.267 Notice that the doctor’s omission dur-
ing the surgery—failing to repair the abdominal tissues requiring re-
pair—could not have increased the risk of harm beyond that posed by 
the patient’s injuries from the car accident, i.e., beyond the risk that 
would have been present had the doctor chosen not to get involved. 
The doctor’s failure to make the necessary repairs was a failure to 
ameliorate the injuries for which the patient sought treatment and 
not, in any sense, an aggravation of those injuries. Assume further 
that it could be shown that the doctor’s intervention did not preclude 
or discourage any other available doctors from offering assistance 
(assume he was the only surgeon capable of performing the necessary 
operation who, at the time the patient was brought into the emergen-
cy room, was within a reasonable distance of the hospital).268 Would 
it nevertheless seem fair to excuse the doctor from liability on the 
basis that he did not place the patient in a worse condition than he 
would have been in had the doctor chosen not to intervene (in which 
case the patient would presumably have died)? To put this question 
another way: in light of the fact that the doctor’s negligent act 1) was 
committed in the course of a gratuitous attempt to assist a helpless 
and gravely imperiled person and 2) did not, in at least one definite 
sense, make matters worse, is it unjust that he be held liable? 
  
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Matts, 308 N.W.2d at 286. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 287. 
 268. This assumption is necessary to make Matts a genuine example of non-worsening samarital 
negligence. 
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I believe it is just to hold the doctor liable under these circum-
stances. Given the extraordinary degree of control the doctor has, 
upon taking charge, willingly chosen to assume over the patient’s 
well-being and the patient’s consequently radical susceptibility to 
being harmed (or benefitted) by the doctor’s actions, it seems fair to 
charge the doctor with liability for any harm that results from a fail-
ure to use due care, even if the resulting harm is precisely the same as 
that which would have resulted had the doctor failed to intervene. 
Doctors, as part of their professional duties, routinely assume such an 
extraordinary degree of control over the well-being of others and are 
specially trained to manage such control with care. Moreover, the 
very premise of a doctor’s undertaking is to ameliorate (or disrupt the 
natural worsening of) the condition for which the patient has sought 
treatment. Indeed, in ordinary (i.e., non-samarital) medical malprac-
tice cases, a physician can be held liable for negligently failing to 
ameliorate the patient’s pre-existing condition.269 Finally, and most 
importantly, although they labor under no legal duty to volunteer 
their services in an emergency, doctors are bound by an ethical duty 
to do so.270 In such a case, the beneficent nature of the physician’s 
undertaking to assist is somewhat diluted, since, in light of the ethical 
duty to assist in emergencies, her intervention cannot be regarded as 
truly voluntary. The doctor in Matts may not have been under a legal 
duty to offer his services to the accident victim but, in light of his 
ethical duty to do so, a refusal might well have tarnished his profes-
  
 269. See 1 Med. Malpractice, supra note 43, § 4.02 nn.10, 12 & 13 (Dec. 2007) (citing examples of 
cases in which courts imposed malpractice liability for negligent omissions such as failure to hospital-
ize, failure to inform patient of diagnosis or need for treatment, failure to prescribe necessary medica-
tion, and failure to correctly diagnose patient’s condition). 
 270. See Principles of Medical Ethics, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/principles-medical-
ethics.page? (last visited Oct. 25, 2012) (“A physician shall, in the provision of appropriate patient care, 
except in emergencies, be free to choose whom to serve, with whom to associate, and the environment in 
which to provide medical care.”) (emphasis added); Opinion 8.11—Neglect of Patient, AM. MED. 
ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opini 
on811.page? (last visited Oct. 25, 2012) (“Physicians are free to choose whom they will serve. The 
physician should, however, respond to the best of his or her ability in cases of emergency where first aid 
treatment is essential.”). 
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sional reputation.271 Contrast this with the situation of the lay rescu-
ers in the stop-at-the-tavern and empty-gas-tank examples who could 
have driven past the bleeding pedestrian without facing any legal or 
professional repercussions. In light of these considerations, it would 
seem odd, from the standpoint of corrective justice, to relieve a doc-
tor of the obligation to use reasonable care in attempting to do the 
very thing she is trained to do, and which she is ethically required to 
do, simply because she is doing it as a volunteer. Leaving aside these 
two types of cases, though, I have provided an important qualifica-
tion to my general conclusion that there is no non-instrumental, fair-
ness-based rationale for the Good Samaritan immunity. Where a lay 
rescuer, acting in good faith, has, without worsening the imperiled 
person’s position, negligently failed to prevent the pre-existing peril 
from taking its harmful course, such failure does not, from a fairness 
standpoint, warrant shifting any portion of the resulting loss onto the 
rescuer. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have argued that liability for samarital negligence 
is not, in principle, unfair. I have attempted to prove this contention 
by showing that, except in narrow circumstances, a volunteer rescu-
er’s failure to exercise reasonable care does give rise to a moral obli-
gation to repair the injury, regardless of the fact that the failure may 
not have been morally culpable. If this is true, it follows that the 
Good Samaritan immunity cannot, in its present form, be justified on 
fairness grounds. Except in the relatively small group of cases in 
which it shields a lay rescuer from liability for non-worsening negli-
gence,272 the immunity would have to rest on the forward-looking, 
instrumental rationale that courts have typically offered. Thus, if the 
Good Samaritan immunity is a law worth having, it must be because 
of its efficacy in incentivizing voluntary rescues. 
  
 271. Matts v. Homsi, 308 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (per curiam). 
 272. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
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My deeper ambition is to suggest that the case of the clumsy Sa-
maritan reveals something important about the moral underpinnings 
of negligence liability generally. Because, in a wide range of circum-
stances, it seems intuitively just to require the clumsy Samaritan to 
repair an injury caused by his negligence, a corrective justice ra-
tionale for negligence liability should be able to explain this intuition. 
I argue that only a corrective justice rationale centered on the actor’s 
moral responsibility for negligently harming another person—rather 
than on the actor’s moral culpability in connection with the harm-
ing—can do so. If the moral basis of negligence liability is the injur-
er’s selfishness or disrespect, it is hard to see why a volunteer rescuer 
who strives wholeheartedly and in good faith to bring an imperiled 
person to safety should ever be held liable for her clumsiness or in-
eptitude in performing the rescue. In other words, if culpability-based 
theories are correct, samarital negligence liability should only be ap-
propriate in cases like Zelenko or the stop-at-the-tavern, where the 
rescuer’s conduct passes beyond a good-faith mistake or miscalcula-
tion into the realm of bad faith, gross negligence, or recklessness. 
But our intuitions suggest otherwise. I posit that most of us believe 
that, from a fairness standpoint, some degree of liability is warrant-
ed—even in cases like Swenson, Jackson, and Gavagan, where the 
rescuer’s negligence consists of an honest mistake made in the course 
of a good-faith attempt to bring the imperiled person to safety. If that 
is true, culpability-based versions of the corrective justice rationale 
for negligence liability are deficient in not being able to account for 
our intuitions in this particular area of the law. From the standpoint 
of corrective justice, the rationale for imposing liability on the negli-
gent injurer must rest not on a sense that the injurer did something 
morally wrong in causing harm to another person but rather on a 
sense that the injurer, simply by virtue of the dangerousness of her 
conduct, owns the harm and has a moral obligation to repair it. 
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